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¡Que vivan los estudiantes,

Long live the students,

jardín de las alegrías!

garden of joys!

Son aves que no se asustan

They are birds who are not afraid

de animal ni policía,

of neither animals nor police,

y no le asustan las balas

and they do not fear the bullets

ni el ladrar de la jauría.

nor the howling pack.

Caramba y zamba la cosa,

Caramba y zamba la cosa,

que viva la astronomía.

long live astronomy

—Violeta Parra, “Me gustan los estudiantes”
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Introduction
Hundreds of students had congregated outside the Casa Central on the morning of
April 11, 2017, when my micro arrived at the Universidad de Playa Ancha (UPLA), the
public university where I studied for a semester. Peers informed me that classes had been
canceled for the marcha educacional, a national demonstration protesting a recent education
reform proposed by then-President Michelle Bachelet. My classmates invited me to join them
behind the department’s banner, and together we proceeded down to Plaza Sotamayor,
Valparaíso’s central square and the starting point for all marches. There, we were joined by
hundreds of students from other universities, all carrying their own banners and signs. Once
assembled at the plaza, a classmate passed around a sheet for contact information and
explained our contingency plan in case authorities moved to break up the demonstration.
The march processed through the city center where truck drivers honked and office
workers leaned out of windows, raining down scraps of paper confetti in support. Chanting,
singing, and walking to the beat of several large drums, the march was an effervescent mass
of student energy. As we marched, we were flanked by police vehicles and guanacos, trucks
with pressurized water cannons named after the spitting guanaco, a relative of the llama. By
the time we reached the site of the national congress, police forces blocked the procession.
Minutes later, guanacos began spraying at students and bystanders. The crowd scattered and
I ran up a side street. A normal day for Chilean students.
In the past decade, student protests and subsequent police repression have become
commonplace in Chile. Students made headlines worldwide in 2011 with protests such as a
flash mob of Michael Jackson’s “Thriller,” “kiss-ins,” and a theatrical mid-winter beach
scene in Santiago’s Plaza de Armas. These protests, popularly known as the Chilean Winter,
1

demanded that former (and recently reelected) President Sebastián Piñera’s administration
eliminate university tuition by renationalizing the copper industry, decreasing military
spending, and implementing a major tax reform. At its core, the movement criticized the
massive socioeconomic disparities resulting from the neoliberal order established under the
dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990).
But 2011 was not the first time that students took to the streets and redirected the
political agenda to address their grievances. Five years earlier, secondary students occupied
hundreds of schools across the country. Dubbed the Penguin Revolution after students’ black
and white uniforms, this wave of mobilizations demanded free bus passes and an end to
Pinochet-era legislation that had placed schools under municipal control.
These waves of protest represent the continuation of a long and hallowed tradition of
student activism that dates back to 1906, the founding year of Chile’s oldest student
federation, the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh). In the early
1920s, students found common cause with a burgeoning anarchist labor movement, and
several decades of episodic mobilizations climaxed in 1970 with the election of socialist
president, Salvador Allende. Much changed, however, following the military coup d’état on
September 11, 1973. Over the next sixteen years of Pinochet’s dictatorship, student and
popular organizations were disbanded and repressed, and thousands of students,
professionals, and laborers were tortured and “disappeared.”
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Chile has served as a testing ground for radical
neoliberal restructuring pioneered by the “Chicago Boys,” a group of Chilean economists
trained at the University of Chicago. Neoliberal ideology posited that the free market should
regulate the economy with minimal state intervention. This manifested itself in reforms that
2

privatized the state’s industries and social services and created markets for them. Seeking to
undo the economic reforms and nationalizations implemented under Allende and begun by
his predecessor, Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), Pinochet and the Chicago Boys privatized
Chile’s principal industries, banking and insurance companies, and social services. Placing
control of education, healthcare, and natural resources in the hands of private companies, the
dictator’s neoliberal agenda produced what is commonly referred to as the “Chilean miracle.”
While the country’s GDP certainly burgeoned under military rule, socioeconomic inequality
grew exponentially. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Chile, the only South American country in the organization, currently
has the second highest levels of socioeconomic inequality after Mexico.1
Education was particularly hard hit by these reforms. Through the process of
municipalization, the regime granted municipalities control over secondary schools, thus
decreasing the role of the state. Pinochet and the Chicago Boys promoted school choice,
suggesting that this would increase competition between municipal and private schools and
would thus improve the quality of education. In reality, this only deepened the
socioeconomic divide, as only families of means could afford to send their children to private
schools. At the university level, government funding was drastically reduced, and a new
market of for-profit schools emerged. Education had effectively become a consumer good
controlled by the free market.2 Of all the countries represented by the OECD, Chile ranks
first for educational segregation.3

“Inequality - OECD,” accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm.
For an extensive overview on the neoliberalization of education see, Joseph Collins and John Lear, Chile’s
Free-Market Miracle: A Second Look (Oakland: Food First, 1995), 125–48.
3
OECD 2011, cited in: Cristian Cabalin, “Neoliberal Education and Student Movements in Chile: Inequalities
and Malaise,” Policy Futures in Education 10, no. 2 (2012).
1
2
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In 1988, Pinochet called a national plebiscite that would have enabled him to remain
in power. The plebiscite backfired, and civilian rule was restored two years later. While the
dictatorship was over, Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution remained the law of the land, and before
he stepped down he named himself senator for life. Furthermore, the binomial electoral
system implemented in the Constitution meant that any party that received a third of the vote
was granted a representative. This effectively guaranteed the presence of the political right in
successive democratic administrations, thus protecting the regime’s policies. And while
neoliberal restructuring was a hallmark of the dictatorship, to the surprise of many Chileans,
successive civilian administrations did not substantively alter those principles. The Penguin
Revolution and Chilean Winter thus emerged out of a fragile democracy still beholden to
neoliberal policies.
This thesis explores these two mobilizations as both responses to neoliberalism and as
a continuation of students’ historical antagonism with the state. Through an examination of
Chile’s history of student activism, I seek to understand how the more recent protests both
drew upon and serve as a departure from earlier mobilizations. How have tactics and
demands changed during cycles of contention, and how did their innovative tactics initially
succeed in capturing the public’s imagination, only to lose momentum and support just
months later?
I argue that movements are in part the product of interactions with a changing state.
By analyzing student mobilizations under dictatorship and democracy, I also seek to
understand how the student movement has responded to political openings. What do
mobilizations look like under dictatorship versus liberal and conservative democracies? And
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how do different state actors respond to students and their demands? When has this
relationship been more conciliatory and at which points has it been dangerously antagonistic?
Situating the Chilean student movement within a broader literature of social
movement theory, I ask what distinguishes this case. While Latin America has a storied
history of strident student activism, Chile stands apart from its neighbors in its scale and
character, and it offers a notable counterpoint from student mobilizations in western Europe
and the United States.
Finally, this thesis examines the movement’s limited victories. Have recent
mobilizations been successful? Are students’ interpretations of success too self-critical?
Although my thesis does not provide definitive answers to all these questions, my research
complicates our understanding of what “success” means for social movements.

Literature Review
After a review of the theoretical literature on social movements, I consider
scholarship on the student movement and activism more broadly over three distinct time
periods: the 1920s to the end of the military dictatorship in 1990; the “return to democracy”
through the Penguin Revolution in 2006; and from 2006 until the present.
To contextualize the Chilean student movement within broader social movement
theory, I turn to social scientists Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s understanding of
“contentious politics,” which occur at the intersection of contention, politics, and collective
action. As Tarrow writes, “[c]ollective action becomes contentious when it is used by people
who lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or
5

unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or
authorities.”4 His bottom-up understanding explains how students, a normally marginal group
of actors, have consistently levied claims and brought about political change.
Tilly and Tarrow utilize a political opportunity structure approach, which posits that
contentious politics result from shifting political opportunities. This is a useful framework for
the Chilean student movement, since the nation’s history has been characterized by repeated
bouts of political polarization. Once these openings arise, actors employ “repertoires of
contention” to challenge the political class and bring about change from below. Repertoires
must be disruptive and innovative, drawing attention to the movement and confronting the
existing order. Tarrow presents a Catch 22, however: “[C]ollective actors who have only
disruptive collective action as a resource, by their very actions bring it within the
conventional repertoire and thus deprive themselves of its power.”5 As we will see, the
innovative tactics employed in the 2006 and 2011 mobilizations quickly lost their novelty, as
media attention waned and the numbers of protestors declined.
Anthropologist David Graeber’s work on radical direct action focuses on the
strategies and tactics employed by contemporary social movements to generate attention.
Graeber describes absurd demonstrations, such as anti-globalist anarchists in rubber
jumpsuits and gas masks breaking out into spontaneous street parties. His analysis of these
unconventional actions helps to make sense of similarly outlandish direct action employed by
Chilean students in the past decade. Reflecting on the carnivalesque, festive nature of more
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Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2011 [1994]), 7.
5
Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest (Ithaca:
Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989), 5.
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recent protests, Graeber writes: “Large actions always tend to be represented as ‘festivals of
resistance’ or ‘carnivals against capitalism’; their organizers always explicitly contrast them
with the old, tedious style favored by liberals and socialists, which simply involve marching
along with signs.”6 Such joviality and festive street performance figures prominently into
recent mobilizations, providing a stark contrast from traditional movements.
But not all contentious acts evolve into full-fledged social movements. As Tilly and
Tarrow explain, a social movement is “a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated
performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions and
solidarities that sustain these activities.”7 Throughout its history, the student movement has
utilized organizational structures and creative tactics to levy sustained campaigns. The
movement’s unity, creativity, and ability to leverage sustained campaigns of claim making
ebb and flow, however, resulting in cycles of mobilization followed by a period of dormancy.
Contention is cyclical, Tarrow notes, progressing through three key stages: diffusion;
exhaustion; and radicalization or institutionalization. 8 His understanding of such
mobilizations is essential to my analysis of the 2006 and 2011 movements, particularly their
demobilization. But this cyclicity also means that movements draw from previous cycles,
increasing momentum in a non-linear fashion. As Tarrow relates, “new movements, however
radical or flamboyant they seemed at the time, were part of a general cycle of mobilization,”
borrowing from the tactics and ideology of preceding mobilizations.9 This argument becomes
central to my own historicization of the contemporary student movement.

6

David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2009), 381.
Charles Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015 [2007]),
11.
8
Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform, 214.
9
Tarrow, 4.
7
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While Tilly and Tarrow’s theorizations are fundamental to my understanding of the
Chilean movement, their case studies and arguments are taken from North American and
European social movements during the 1960s and 1970s. Theory on “new social
movements,” which emerged in Europe in the 1980s, lends itself better to the study of
contemporary Latin American movements. This scholarship explores the transition from
traditional, class-based movements to collective identity-based movements in response to
neoliberal state restructuring. These movements can mobilize around issues such as race,
gender, or human rights.10 As sociologist and urbanist Diane Davis contends, Tilly and
Tarrow’s political opportunity structure framework is less popular among contemporary
Latin Americanists who perceive it “as being focused on the state and its actions, or at best
on the political and social conditions that are likely to make state actors respond (or not) to
movement demands,” rather than civil society.11 She argues that new social movement theory
that focuses on collective identity provides a more useful conceptual framework. My
approach utilizes both political opportunity structure and new social movement theory to
make sense of how students formed a collective identity and mobilized under shifting
political conditions in the age of neoliberalism.
Sociologists Susan Eckstein and Manuel Antonio Garretón observe how social
movements have moved away from the “classes” to the “masses,” as Chilean laborers lost
their jobs and their ability to organize under Pinochet.12 To fill the vacuum left by unions,

Steven M. Buechler, “New Social Movement Theory,” ed. George Ritzer, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of
Sociology, 2015, 1-4, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosn022.pub2.
11
For an extensive analysis on the differences between political opportunity structure and new social movement
theory and their relevance to Latin American social movements see, Diane E. Davis, “The Power of Distance:
Re-Theorizing Social Movements in Latin America,” Theory and Society 28, no. 4 (1999): 586.
12
Manuel Antonio Garretón M., “Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of
the Invisible Transition,” in Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, ed. Susan Eckstein
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 259-277.
10
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neighborhood-based groups became more active during the military regime. This argument is
supported by other scholarship that analyzes the emergence of community organizing under
the dictatorship in Santiago’s shantytowns.13
Likewise, Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker, and Vanden’s anthology on twenty-first century
Latin American social movements offers a useful framework of how social movements have
responded to global capitalism. In their introduction, the editors move beyond the social
movements in the “transition-to-democracy” model, “which interpreted social movements as
a temporary outgrowth of the suppression of conventional politics by bureaucraticauthoritarian regimes,” which were prevalent throughout Latin America in the last decades of
the twentieth century. Instead, the editors contend that the new social movements not only
emerged out of transitions to democracy and a legacy of activism, but rather as “a specific
response to the advance of neoliberal globalization.”14 These arguments holds especially true
in the Chilean case. As I will illustrate, the transition to democracy actually stifled, rather
than encouraged, the emergence of social movements; mobilizations would not emerge in
response to neoliberalism until fifteen years after the transition to democratic rule.
These editors also acknowledge the difficulty of maintaining solidarity across popular
sectors in a neoliberal society that seeks to divide and suppress collectivity. As they argue,
the success of these new movements “depends on whether they build community and
collective consciousness so that the perceived commonalities of interest are transformed into
durable alliances.”15 Connections between students and the popular classes, I contend, have

Cathy Lisa Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
Richard Stahler-Sholk, Glen David Kuecker, and Harry E. Vanden, eds., Latin American Social Movements in
the Twenty-First Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 2.
15
Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker, and Vanden, 8.
13
14

9

been one of the deciding factors of a movement’s success but have also been difficult to
maintain.
Even as these authors transcend traditional understandings of labor-led social
movements, the role of students is largely absent in their case studies. While students still
represent a relatively elite part of civil society, the massification of Chilean higher education
has expanded university access and in turn has brought the student movement closer to the
popular classes. This research attempts to fill this gap in conjunction with other scholarship
that focuses specifically on student protest in Chile.

1920s-1990 Scholarship
Sociologists Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer’s history of the FECh from 1918-1957
provided the first overview of the country’s principal student organization. Through
historical analysis of FECh documentation and interviews with student leaders, the authors
explore how the student organization related to political parties, labor unions, the state, and
university administration.16 More recent work from social historians Julio Pinto Vallejos and
Gabriel Salazar presents a comprehensive history of Chilean youth, dating back to the
nineteenth century.17 Historian Fabio Moraga Valle also provides a similarly comprehensive
history focusing on the first three decades of the movement.18 While these histories all

16

Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer, Student Politics in Chile (New York: Basic Books, 1970). For more recent
scholarly analyses of the FECh see, Eduardo Valenzuela and José Weinstein, La FECH de los años veinte, Un
movimiento estudiantil con historia (Santiago: José Manuel Infante, 1982 [1980]); and Garretón and Javier
Martínez, El movimiento estudiantil: Conceptos e historia (Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 1985).
17
Julio Pinto Vallejos and Gabriel Salazar, Niñez y juventud: Construcción cultural de actores emergentes, in
Historia contemporánea de Chile, eds., Salazar and Pinto, (Santiago: LOM Ed, 2002) Vol. 5.
18
Fabio Moraga Valle, Muchachos casi silvestres: La Federación de Estudiantes y el movimiento estudiantil
chileno, 1906-1936 (Santiago: Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, 2007).
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examine different periods, they use similar approaches, focusing on specific leaders and
organizations. Furthermore, by focusing on discrete time periods, these scholars neglect
broader historical analysis.
Interestingly, there is only limited scholarship on the students’ role in Allende’s era.
Most scholarship on this decade focuses instead on university reform. Several scholars have
observed protest from the right against Allende, though their accounts contain little mention
of student participation in these protests.19 Nevertheless, this scholarship provides an
interesting counterpoint and illuminates how the middle class, and women in particular,
became politicized and took to the streets in protest.
Scholarship on student mobilizations after the 1973 coup examines the shift away
from labor organizing to more popular-based protests as labor was repressed and the middle
class negotiated with and acquiesced to the junta. In particular, Garretón notes the emergence
of “women, youth, and social, cultural, and religious groups” which responded to immediate
needs and human rights abuses during the dictatorship.20 Other research focuses specifically
on the role that women played in resistance under the dictatorship.21
Political scientist Cathy Schneider’s ethnography explores the prominence of new
political actors in neighborhood-based organizations in Santiago’s shantytowns. These
grassroots forms of organizing were not new to the dictatorship, she argues, but “lay in the
political heritage of decades of work in the popular culture and in the formation of a skilled

19

Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende, 1964-1973
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
20
Garretón, “Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile,” 273.
21
Carrie Endries, “‘Si la mujer no está, la democracia no va:’ Chilean Women’s Resistance to the Military
Dictatorship (1973-1989),” (Senior Honors Thesis, Bowdoin College, 1997).
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generation of grassroots militants.”22 She argues that in the 1980s, the Communist Party’s
emphasis on the structural nature of the pobladores’ problems fomented a community
solidarity “capable of defeating even the most powerful regime.”23 Her argument, if
romanticized, highlights the alliances that politicized these poblaciones.
In the past few years, cultural historians have provided new approaches to student
activism throughout the twentieth century. This historical approach explores how students,
and youth more broadly, created new spaces for dissent and political expression within
Santiago’s urban landscape. Raymond Craib examines the bohemian, anarchist roots of the
student movement that emerged from close ties between the FECh and anarchist laborers in
the first decades of the century. He also focuses on the state’s repressive response to this
budding alliance.24 Camilo Trumper illustrates how ephemeral urban protest and public art, a
distinctive characteristic of Allende’s Chile, became “one of the first targets of repression by
the military regime that deposed him.”25 Interestingly, street art and urban protest would
reappear after the return to democracy. Trumper also analyzes public protest from the right
under Allende in the form of cacerolazos (“banging of the pots”) and truckers’ strikes,
arguing that it was not only leftist workers who utilized public space as a form of resistance.
Curiously, cacerolazos later became a tactic employed by communities opposed to Pinochet,
and have since played a central role in public protest led by neighborhood organizations and
women in particular.

Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 9.
Schneider, 11.
24
Raymond B. Craib, The Cry of the Renegade: Politics and Poetry in Interwar Chile (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016).
25
Camilo D. Trumper, Ephemeral Histories: Public Art, Politics, and the Struggle for the Streets in Chile
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), 2.
22
23
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By linking public artistic expression to political transitions, Trumper builds upon
political scientist Lyman Chaffee’s understanding of the role of art under dictatorship.
Chaffee argues that street art provides a voice and political platform for those silenced under
dictatorial regimes.26 Written before the explosion of the World Wide Web, however,
Chaffee’s analysis fails to take into account the proliferation of social media platforms.
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Fotolog, a photo-sharing website, have revolutionized how
students communicate and diffuse their messaging. While more traditional forms of
communication, such as posters, are still ubiquitous on Chile’s streets, social media has
enabled protestors to instantaneously share content with a much wider public and to organize
more effectively. Of particular interest to my thesis is the ways in which digital forms of
protest art coexist with more traditional forms of public art and communication.

Transition to Democracy, Penguin Revolution, and Chilean Winter Scholarship
Rich scholarship exists on the “return to democracy” and the lingering effects of
Pinochet’s neoliberal restructuring, especially in the fields of history and political science.
However, there is limited scholarship on the student movement or social mobilizations more
broadly, and this period is commonly treated as a lull in activism. Ample scholarship has
interrogated why the transition to democracy muted civil society activism, and more recently,
several authors have drawn attention to modest pockets of student activism during this
period.

26

Lyman G. Chaffee, Political Protest and Street Art: Popular Tools for Democratization in Hispanic
Countries (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 4.
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Political scientist Philip Oxhorn has argued that the transition to democracy
demobilized popular activism as activists refocused their attention on the electoral
campaign.27 Anthropologist Julia Paley also contends that the conciliatory nature of the
negotiated transition limited popular mobilizations. The threat of a coup loomed large in the
popular imagination during the first years of civilian rule and the Concertación
administrations understandably were wary of popular unrest. As the neoliberal order gutted
social services, community organizations, especially those focused on public health, sought
to fill this void. Paley argues that this organizing represented a new form of political
engagement. Turning away from electoral politics, these community organizations focused
instead “on the influence ordinary people and organized community groups could bring to
bear on the decisions that affected their lives.”28 This important reconceptualization of the
meaning of politics is a common thread in recent mobilizations.
This scholarship fails to track the changing nature of the student movement during the
transition to democracy, however. Historian Thielemann Hernández moves beyond these
analyses of demobilization, challenging the commonly held belief that the movement had
disappeared. If the first decade of Concertación rule was marked by a relative silence, he
argues that there were still incipient mobilizations. By the turn of the millennium, a new
student movement had emerged, led by the radical autonomous left. This movement
embraced horizontalism and distanced itself from the traditional political elite.29 But as
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Theielemann Hernández notes, even as students led substantial protests, suggesting a
reawakening of civil society, it nonetheless never could sustain its momentum.
Scholarship on the Penguin Revolution examines the high school students and
organizations that led the protests, its causes, and the dynamics of the protests themselves.
Political scientist Sofía Donoso and journalists Andrea Domedel and Macarena Peña y Lillo
provide extensive chronicles of the mobilization. While Domedel and Peña y Lillo include
excellent interviews with leaders and provide useful details on the protests, their analyses are
limited.30 Donoso’s article provides greater analysis, exploring the emergence of the
movement and how students mobilized under Bachelet. Donoso breaks down the false
dichotomy between “old” and “new” movements, asserting that the Penguin Revolution both
mobilized around a collective identity and presented material demands, providing a balance
between the political opportunity structure approach and new social movement theory.31
Finally, political scientist Peter Cummings argues for a generational explanation for the
emergence of the movement. He also expands upon the political opening framework,
asserting that it was actor agency that enabled students to respond to Bachelet’s promises for
participation.32
Secondary scholarship on the 2011 Chilean Winter is rather limited, both in volume
and scope. Existing literature focuses primarily on the protests and chronology of the
movement, seeking to explain why it erupted with such magnitude. Francisco Figueroa, who
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served as Vice President of the FECh in 2011, provides an excellent, if rose-tinted, first-hand
account of the mobilization. His narrative is instructive and reveals biases and internal
tensions within the movement; Figueroa, a member of the Izquierda Autónoma, a universitybased political movement, lost the FECh presidency to the communist Camila Vallejo by a
narrow margin. Interestingly, Vallejo, who is often regarded as the protagonist of this
movement, is barely mentioned in Figueroa’s book, perhaps reflecting the ever-present
factionalism of the Chilean left.
In my analysis of the innovative tactics that came to define the Chilean Winter, I rely
especially on the research of Alicia del Campo, who focuses on the intersection of politics,
memory, and theater. Del Campo argues that through the occupation of space, both literal
school occupations and protests and street theater, students re-appropriated the public sphere,
transforming the streets from individualized, “neoliberal” spaces into public spaces of
collective protest.33 Her scholarship also provides a Chile-specific complement to Graeber’s
analyses of direct action and new social movements.
While there is a growing body of scholarship on the 2011 movement, primarily in the
forms of articles and dissertations, there are few studies that take holistic, historicized
approaches to this movement. Through my research and analysis, I contribute to this
scholarship by uniting the different lenses of analysis in the secondary scholarship that focus
on the tactics, messages, and historical precedents. My historical approach to the more recent
movements allows me to take a step back and view larger trends across Chile’s long history
of activism.
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Primary Sources
To complement the secondary scholarship, this thesis relies upon a wealth of primary
sources. These sources provide an array of first-hand accounts and opinions on the recent
waves of mobilizations, but they also contain strong biases. Although they may express a
progressive perspective, these sources nonetheless offer critical insight into the perceptions
of the students, their allies, and the state during the mobilizations.
For press coverage, I primarily consulted El Mercurio, Chile’s oldest newspaper.
Known for its conservative slant, El Mercurio provides often heavy-handed critiques of
student protests, emphasizing violent acts by the students and downplaying turnout and the
impact of demonstrations. Though not indicative of public sentiment, El Mercurio perhaps
serves as an accurate barometer of elite opinion.
At the Archive of the FECh (AFECh) I consulted magazines and posters created by the
Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confech), the national organizing body of student
federations. Articles and photographs in Revista Bello Público (RBP), the student-run
publication of the Universidad de Chile, provide excellent, though understandably selfserving, student perspectives. Editorials and columns written by FECh presidents likewise
offer a useful counterpoint to mainstream media coverage. Posters from marches and
demonstrations in the past decade are valuable sources for understanding how the movement
sought to represent itself to the broader public. For a relatively small archive, the AFECh
possesses a prodigious collection of materials, though there are some gaps in its coverage.
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Additionally, I use photography and videos from public platforms such as Fotolog,
Facebook, and YouTube to complement other textual primary sources. Videos and
photographs are especially useful for the 2011 protests, which were characterized by their
innovative tactics and theatricality. These sources lend themselves to unique spatial and
visual analysis that articles and interviews are unable to provide.
Finally, I conducted twelve interviews with fifteen current or former students found
through personal contacts and social media networks. Utilizing a semi-structured
questionnaire, I elicited opinions and experiences that illustrate the movement’s
heterogeneity. Those interviewed represent a small age range and only three universities
(Universidad de Chile, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, and UPLA), far from a
representative sample of the movement. Interviews were conducted in Santiago and
Valparaíso in August, 2017 and January, 2018 and ranged from half an hour to an hour and a
half. While some informants held leadership roles in the FECh, others are active in feminist
university organizations or are merely politically involved students. Since all students are
active in the movement and identify with the political left, these interviews are
understandably biased, but provide a unique perspective on the trajectory, accomplishments,
and shortcomings of the movement.

Argument
While much scholarship regards the 2006 and 2011 mobilizations as new phenomena, I
argue that these mobilizations are the continuation of a constant, if cyclical, legacy of more
than a century of student activism. With that said, the more recent waves of protest arose in
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an entirely different political, social, and economic context. Born into the neoliberal
remnants of Pinochet’s dictatorship, these students inherited a unique set of political and
economic challenges. Unlike their parents’ generations, they did not grow up with the same
fear of repression, but rather with the expectation of democratic participation. Mobilizing
against the lingering effects of Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms, the current movement also
emerged in conjunction with coterminous social movements, particularly indigenous and
environmental protests.
Coming to terms with the relative successes of the movement is a thorny topic. On the
face of it, the students secured only modest concessions from the Bachelet and Piñera
administrations. But their ability to alter public opinion about the need for educational
reform, their success in galvanizing massive popular support for their political agenda, and
their impressive ability to keep the political pressure on successive administrations, despite
significant repression, should be counted as significant victories. Additionally, students’
capacity to galvanize the popular classes in the past decade reflects the movement’s success.
Joining forces with labor unions, environmental and indigenous movements, and more
recently, the feminist movement, students have forged solidarity networks, at some points
stronger than others. Ironically, the movement’s heterogeneity has also been its Achilles heel.
Political diversity has simultaneously served to broaden the movement’s focus while also
contributing to its demobilization.
I argue that these incomplete victories and periods of decay are part of broader cycles
of contention. Despite its episodic character, the movement has historically demonstrated its
ability to provoke responses from both extremes of the political spectrum, sometimes
resulting in concessions, while at other times, in brutal repression. While the movement has
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been more successful at certain points in history than others, students have consistently
served as the nation’s moral compass, illuminating socioeconomic inequalities and
demanding political reform. Acting on behalf of their families and the interests of the popular
classes more broadly, students have pushed the state for socioeconomic reform, often bearing
the brunt of the state’s response. This carrot and stick approach has come to characterize the
contentious relationship between students and the state over the past century.
Chapter One opens with the founding of the FECh in 1906 following students’ first act
of public rebellion. In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the FECh and the student
movement more broadly from its early roots to a heightened phase of collaboration with
anarcho-syndicalists in the 1920s, followed by a period of intense state repression and
inevitable decay. Students would then rise up again and contribute to the expulsion of the
dictator Carlos Ibáñez (1927-1931). Next, I examine the university reforms of the 1960s
which contributed to Allende’s electoral victory. In this period, I pay attention to how middle
class women redefined political participation in the public sphere leading up to the military
coup in 1973. I conclude with an examination of student and union-led protests in 1983 that
led to Pinochet’s defeat in 1989.
Chapter Two examines the re-composition of the student movement from the return to
democracy through the eruption of the Penguin Revolution in 2006. I argue that although this
decade was punctuated by modest, if brief, mobilizations, the plebiscite effectively drained
the movement of its energy. Furthermore, the Concertación government took conscious steps
to limit popular organizing in its early years in order to protect its fragile democracy from the
threat of another coup. By the mid-2000s, however, a new generation born into democracy
would mobilize without the fear of repression that had inhibited their parents. Moreover,
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after fifteen years of Concertación hegemony, Bachelet’s promises of greater participation
raised expectations, providing frustrated students an opportunity to once again demand
change. Through marches, strikes, and tomas (school occupations), secondary students
captured the media and public’s attention, forcing educational reform onto Bachelet’s
agenda. While the Penguin Revolution achieved some of its demands, it did little to
dismantle Pinochet’s neoliberal education system. By the end of the academic year,
exhaustion and factionalism within the student leadership effectively brought about the
demobilization of the Penguin Revolution.
Chapter Three focuses on the Chilean Winter in 2011—the largest wave of protests to
date. I begin by examining indigenous and environmental protests that broke out in the south,
arguing that these manifestations of discontent and demands for greater public transparency
provided the necessary preconditions for the reemergence of the student movement.
Mobilizing against the right-wing government of Piñera, students demanded free, quality
education. In response, they were met with brutal state repression, on an order of magnitude
unseen since the dictatorship. What distinguishes the Chilean Winter, I contend, were its
innovative tactics and use of public space that enabled the movement to reach a broader
public. Like the Penguin Revolution, students did not achieve their main demands, and the
movement once again demobilized by the end of the year. But as I argue, students brought
education reform back into the spotlight, decidedly shifted public opinion against Piñera, and
began to dismantle key pillars of Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy.
This thesis concludes with an examination of the movement’s progress since the
Chilean Winter. Drawn largely from interviews, I suggest that while the movement has not
returned with the same vigor, its ability to reach out to the popular classes and connect with
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other social movements augers well for the future. I conclude with an analysis of Chile’s
most recent election, which, on the one hand, saw the surprising emergence of a new leftist
coalition, but, nevertheless, ended in Piñera’s reelection.
As Tilly and Tarrow argue, social movements form at the nexus of contention,
collective action, and politics. I now turn to the first moment of contentious collective action
against the state that sparked the emergence of the student movement.
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Chapter I
Radical Roots
¡Que la Federación de Estudiantes sea el sagrado abrazo que nos una; y así,
respetados y potentes, marchamos dejada a nuestro paso una estela brillante de gloria
y de admiración!34
José Ducci, 1906
On August 7, 1906, medical student José Ducci proclaimed these words to a crowd
assembled outside of the Universidad de Chile. The previous evening, jeers rang out from the
balconies of Santiago’s Teatro Municipal during a ceremony honoring students’ efforts to
stem an influenza outbreak in Valparaíso a year earlier. Students and their families were not
informed of the ceremony until the morning of, and they were relegated to the upper galleries
while officials and families of the elite assumed the seats of honor below. Snubbed by the
ceremony that was intended to honor them, the indignant students erupted in protest and
refused to accept the awards. They gathered in the plaza outside the theater, and law and
mathematics students decided to go on strike in protest. Shortly thereafter, the protestors
formed Chile’s first student organization, the FECh. Ducci assumed the presidency and a
movement was born.35
This initial rebellious, anti-oligarchic protest would characterize the FECh throughout
its early history. Throughout this entire era, the student movement maintained near-constant
opposition to the political class. Only during the leftist coalition of the Frente Popular (19361941) and Allende’s short-lived Unidad Popular (UP) administrations (1970-1973) did
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students align with the government, though even then students continued to criticize the
political establishment.
Though the FECh has served as the backbone of the student movement since 1906,
other student federations, notably Santiago and Valparaíso’s Federación de Estudiantes de la
Universidad Católica (FEUC), also played significant roles in the movement’s early history.
These other federations challenged the FECh’s hegemony, and in the case of the FEUC,
challenged the predominantly leftist identity of the student movement. Together, these
multiple organizations make up what I refer to as the student movement.36
The movement never embodied one set of political beliefs, but rather reflected the
heterogeneity of its students. While the movement has for the most part consistently
maintained a leftist identity, Chilean students, like their peers elsewhere throughout Latin
America, are ideologically and socioeconomically diverse. In addition, the composition of
the movement and its leadership has changed over the past century as higher education has
become more accessible, though a university degree is still beyond the reach of many.
Chilean students were not the only ones mobilizing throughout the first half of the
twentieth century; neighboring countries also witnessed vibrant student movements, regularly
coming into contact with Chilean students through regional congresses. What distinguishes
the Chilean movement from its regional counterparts is its historically close ties to the
working class and unions. Although student-working class alliances have ebbed and flowed
over time, students have periodically aligned with unions and fought for material
improvements in the lives of the popular and working classes. At times, the labor movement
spearheaded political mobilizations, while at other points the students were in the vanguard.
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Through this alliance, the student movement broadened its focus beyond the confines of the
campus and fought for larger political changes.
This chapter provides an assessment of the student movement from its founding in
1906 until the end of the dictatorship in 1990. After analyzing its early bohemian roots and
the anarchist ideology that emerged after the First World War, I track the evolution of more
Marxist tendencies during Carlos Ibáñez del Campo’s dictatorship (1927-1931) and the
Frente Popular era (1936-1941). Throughout this early period, I pay particular attention to the
radicalizing influence that working class organizations had on students. Next, I turn to the
university reform and mobilizations during the 1960s that contributed to the victory of
Allende’s UP coalition in 1970. It is no small irony that during this brief moment of leftist
governance a significant number of middle and upper-class families took to the streets to
protest Allende’s socialist reforms. I explore how these mobilizations transformed public
space and brought families, and women in particular, out of the private sphere, a trend that
would continue during the Pinochet period as popular classes vied for control of the streets.
Methods of protest necessarily changed during the dictatorship, however, as organizations
were forced to operate clandestinely until mass mobilizations reemerged in 1983. Owing to
Pinochet’s fierce repression of unions and the labor movement, students and the popular
classes assumed key leadership roles in the resistance, eventually contributing to the return of
democracy in 1990.

Emergence of the Movement
Although founded in 1906, the FECh did not truly develop into a progressive mass
movement until after World War I. In its initial years, student leadership aligned with the
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University’s administration and Rector Valentín Letelier, who served from 1906 until 1913.
This period was not characterized by antagonism with university authorities and the state.
Instead, the movement was primarily focused on the sponsoring of cultural improvement
events, such as lectures, discussions, and readings groups. In its first decade, the FECh was
composed of a bohemian, largely middle-class student body, led by students from the
medical school.
From its inception, the FECh defined itself as anti-oligarchic and anti-clerical. But as
sociologists Eduardo Valenzuela and José Weinstein argue: “Detrás del movimiento no
existía programa, sino ante todo la afirmación irreverente y temperamental de una juventud
renovadora y progresista.”37 While this youthful movement may have lacked a coherent
vision and political ideology, it made clear its disapproval of traditional, elitist politics. As
the student movement grew closer to more radical elements of the working class in the
1920s, this disapproval with Chile’s political class became more apparent.
In the 1910s, medical students living in Santiago’s central barrios came in close
contact with their working class neighbors. These daily “interactions with Santiago’s urban
poor and working classes, who had little access to adequate health care and treatment, who
went hungry, and who lacked housing, dramatically shaped their political perspectives, as did
the glaring inequalities of the city,”38 Craib argues. Gradually, students established informal
political and cultural alliances with unions and artisans, in turn adopting a bohemian,
anarchist political identity and disavowing their earlier belief in liberalism.
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As a result, the FECh’s early leaders began to address social and political issues
beyond the university. In particular, students believed that workers deserved access to
education. The FECh established popular schools that provided evening classes for workers,
the most famous being the Universidad Popular Lastarría, established in 1910.39 For many
middle-class university students, this alliance helped assuage pangs of class privilege:
“Coming largely from modest middle-class families, they felt themselves to be partially
victims of a system that condemned the mass of their fellows to grinding poverty.”40
However, Bonilla and Glazer argue that this new partnership with union leaders was not a
paternalistic, top-down relationship and that it was in fact the workers, not the students, who
drove this initiative.41
If this early bohemian identity demonstrated concern for the working class, it
remained a largely apolitical movement “que se estructuró basado en la alegría juvenil y en
cierto ambiente de cofradía en la que se revivía una fraternidad,”42 according to Moraga
Valle. But the student movement’s bohemian student base became increasingly politicized
and refocused on issues of the popular classes.43 Influenced by a growing wave of leftist
ideology following the Russian Revolution and emboldened by the election of progressives
like Santiago Labarca and Juan Gandulfo as president and vice president of the FECh,
respectively, the movement radicalized in 1918.44 Students strengthened alliances with the
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working class and “expanded what it meant to be a student, what the role of the FECh could
and should be, the idea of who could engage in politics, and the very meaning of politics
itself.”45 Labor organizations held meetings at the FECh center, fostering linkages between
students and workers and transforming the physical space of the center.
That partnership was confirmed in 1917 when the Federación Obrera de Chile
(FOCh) and the FECh jointly established the Asamblea Obrera de Alimentación Nacional
(AOAN). On November 22, 1918, the AOAN organized a hunger march to address food
scarcity and economic disparity more generally (See Figure 1:1).46 The FECh leadership also
began working with the Industrial Workers of the World (also known as the Wobblies),
participating in direct actions and eschewing participation in democratic government.47 The

Figure 1:1
March organized by the AOAN on November 22, 1918. Courtesy of Memoria
Chilena, http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-98694.html
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Wobblies were anarcho-syndicalist labor leaders born out of organizing efforts of
Valparaíso’s port workers in the 1910s. Through nonviolent direct action such as “boycotts,
forms of sabotage, the general strike, and ‘labeling,’ primarily for the purposes of fomenting
autonomy, mutual aid, and worker control,”48 the Wobblies fought for greater rights for the
working class. The Wobblies’ anti-statist, anti-clerical ideology galvanized the student
movement during the late 1910s and early 1920s.
Boisterous street protest became commonplace in working class neighborhoods
during the early 1920s. Within this defined urban space, students and the working class
began to take control of the streets and public spaces through marches and demonstrations as
well as neighborhood festivals. However, these mobilizations were not well planned and
lacked a strategic vision, privileging a propagandistic antagonism over a clear message.
Student demonstrations often assumed a mischievous tone, taking the form of practical
joking, “mocking authority and tradition.”49 Like the initial protest that sparked the
movement, these inchoate mobilizations featured biting, anti-oligarchical critiques even as
they were more playful in tone.
As the urban masses became emboldened, municipal authorities came to realize that
their traditional prerogatives were under threat. As Craib relates, “[i]t was not necessarily
disorder that [the elite] feared, but a change in the order of things—or, even worse, a new
order…. Nominally public spaces that had long been the purview of the city’s elite—central
parks and plazas, for example—appeared increasingly available to nonelites.”50 This
democratization of space became a defining factor of the student-worker alliance.
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Across the Andes in 1918, a university reform movement originating in Córdoba,
Argentina, ignited a wave of student activism throughout Latin America. While scholarship
on the university reform movement emphasizes its contagious impact throughout the
hemisphere, scholars of Chilean history argue that the impacts were not felt as strongly in
their country. Indeed, Chile’s educational system had already advanced well beyond the point
to which its Argentine compatriots aspired. For instance, Chile’s public universities were
already more secular and accessible to the middle class. Historiographical emphasis on the
Córdoba Reform movement also minimizes earlier transnational contacts and influence; well
before 1918, students were attending congresses in Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina.51
A key difference that highlights Chile’s exceptionalism is that the Córdoba Reform
was focused on internal issues specific to students. As Moraga Valle relates, Argentine
students’ close alliances with the political class and university administration enabled them to
push for university reform. Chilean students, without such political alliances, had to agitate
for change elsewhere, instead focusing on issues beyond the university. Furthermore, “el
movimiento estudiantil chileno había nacido con una fuerte impronta social que lo llevó a
volcarse tanto hacia ‘afuera’... como hacia ‘adentro’ (la protección de sus asociados). La
reforma Cordobeza y las distintas modalidades que asumió en la Argentina, demuestran que
fue exclusivamente un fenómeno intra universitario.”52 A delegate sent to Argentina in 1918
echoed this difference between internal and external efforts: “[P]ara ejercer influencia en el
mejoramiento intelectual del país y acelerar la evolución del porvenir es necesario que esté
vinculado al pueblo donde está la fuerza virginal de nuestra raza de virtudes tan sólidas y
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austeras.”53 As these regional differences illustrate, the Chilean movement was not focused
solely on the university itself. Instead, the movement extended beyond the classroom,
seeking broader political change.
The nationalist emphasis of the Córdoba Reform also failed to resonate with the
Chilean movement, which, owing to its anarchist orientation, had adopted an internationalist
focus.54 By 1918, the country was significantly impacted by global forces, primarily the first
World War, the spread of socialism, and border disputes with Peru. After World War I and
the development of synthetic nitrate, Chile’s economy, which had previously been dependent
upon its northern nitrate industry, lay in ruins. Moreover, the Russian Revolution captured
the imagination of students and further radicalized the labor movement. These global forces
helped to mobilize the labor movement and their student supporters.55
Tensions between the FECh and the government reached a breaking point in 1920. In
an escalating territorial dispute with Peru, President Juan Luis Sanfuentes Andonaegui (19151920) deployed troops to the Bolivian-Peruvian border. FECh students, holding true to their
pacifist character and acting out of solidarity with Peruvian and Bolivian students, publicly
opposed the regime’s jingoistic propaganda. Their opposition to the government’s belligerent
stance against its neighbors provoked a nationalistic backlash, resulting in the sacking and
burning of the FECh center. This violence, in conjunction with the death of the jailed
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anarchist poet José Domingo Gómez Rojas, solidified the movement’s anarchist, antioligarchical spirit.56
Later that year, the moderate Arturo Alessandri’s (1920-1924) ascension to
presidency raised hopes among students and workers that the oligarchy’s hold on political
power would be broken. But Alessandri’s victory proved to be “an empty triumph that
produced no fundamental changes in Chilean social structure.”57 Students and workers alike
quickly became disillusioned with Alessandri and his top-down reforms. The FECh became
distanced from the FOCH, and a growing divide emerged between an anarchist faction and a
reformist faction interested in working within the parliamentary system. If the early 1920s
brought students and workers together under the banner of anarchism, it also fractured the
student movement. By 1922, the Wobblies and anarcho-syndicalism had largely disappeared,
due both to state repression and the emergence of the communist and socialist parties.58 The
student movement began to fade by this year, too, owing to heightened internal conflict. As
Labarca and Gandulfo solidified alliances with the working class, their militancy exacerbated
tensions within the FECh.59 This would become a common trend in future cycles of
mobilizations.
Disillusioned with Alessandri and weakened by internal divisions, the movement
remained relatively dormant until 1931, when students would once again mobilize to
overthrow Ibáñez’s dictatorship. It was a different breed of students that led this
mobilization, however. Instead of the bohemians of the 1910s and the anarchists of the early
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1920s, these protests were led by constitutional law students who worked within the political
system. In addition, the 1931 protests were markedly different as Ibáñez´s dictatorship had
weakened the labor movement’s organizing capabilities, much like Pinochet’s dictatorship
would do several decades later. Again, the student movement adopted a pacifist approach in
opposition to the ruling elite as students went on strike, occupying the Casa Central of the
Universidad de Chile and taking to the streets en masse. On July 25, this pressure forced
Ibáñez to step down.60
In retrospect, the mobilizations of 1931 must be viewed as a momentary spike in
student protest during a period of relative quiescence that extended from 1922 until the late
1930s. As Pinto Vallejos and Salazar argue, the generation of the 1920s became incorporated
into the “columna central de la ‘nueva’ clase política…y de los estratos superiores del
aparato burocrático del Estado.”61 This generation thus entered into mainstream politics,
shedding the radical politics of their youth, much like their successors would following the
2011 mobilizations.62 With the institutionalization and cooptation of this generation, the
movement lost its radicalism and energy. Furthermore, as Pinto Vallejos and Salazar argue,
students were not mobilizing against the oligarchic political system, but rather against a
personalist dictatorship. Once Ibáñez had been deposed, students no longer had a cause
around which to mobilize.63 A similar conundrum would befall the movement following the
overthrow of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite.
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During the progressive Frente Popular administration, the FECh aligned with the
government for the first time. The Frente Popular years saw a strengthening and expansion of
the left, but these trends were not necessarily reflected in the student movement. As Bonilla
and Glazer related, the student movement served as a barometer of national politics. The
FECh became a political object to be won rather than an organization with values and
ideology.64
While students maintained ties with laborers, these linkages were loose and informal.
Furthermore, as Bonilla and Glazer observe, it was the working class, not the students, that
were the vanguard. Although the FECh actively participated, the Federation “was just one of
a large number of organizations that were swept along in the upsurge of popular fervor
aroused by the popular front and the promise of new and better times held out by Aguirre
Cerda’s [1938-1941] candidacy.”65
As the labor movement took the helm, this allowed students to focus on internal
rebuilding and university-specific goals. The Chilean Communist Party at the time supported
the idea that the students should not be focused on leading a socialist revolution, but rather
should be turned inward “to work for the democratization of the university and to prepare it
to become a free institution…providing cultural services to the whole people rather than to a
narrow intellectual or professional elite.”66
The student movement under the Frente Popular can also be distinguished from its
predecessors by its lack of charismatic leaders, which Bonilla and Glazer call a “historical
void” in the collective memory of the future movement. Furthermore, the student movement
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of the 1940s failed to produce a clear vision and guiding values, such as the “Declaration of
Principles” of 1920. What limited scholarship that exists on the movement during this era
suggests that while it was a time of unity for the left, student mobilizations lay relatively
dormant.
During the early years of the Cold War, the student movement would reengage with
labor organizations and levy an antiimperialist critique against the state for its ties to the
United States. With the founding of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) in 1953,
students and laborers re-solidified their alliance. Once again, students mobilized against
Ibáñez’s second term as president from 1952-1958, though he was democratically elected
this time around. Under his presidency, students took to the streets, staging large
demonstrations that often ended in violence against students and laborers. As Pinto Vallejos
and Salazar note: “Callejeando, se reencontró con su identidad dormida, perdida o reprimida.
Lo que sin duda era una hecho memorable, que debía celebrarse, callejeramente.” 67 In this
decade, then, a renewed relationship with labor enabled students to return to the national
political stage.
But the student movement in the 1950s never approximated the earlier mobilizations in
the 1920s and 1930s. While the FECh upheld its connection with the CUT, these links were
“informal and sporadic” due to internal conflicts within both organizations. As Bonilla and
Glazer relate, “[s]tudents retained some sentimental notions about solidarity with the working
class and some illusion that working-class people looked to them for leadership; however,
these were not translated into any effective action on the part of the FECH as an
organization.”68
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Over the first half century of the movement’s history, students maintained a mostly
consistent oppositional stance, at times more active than the labor movement and at other
points mostly following organized labor’s lead. As internal political divisions beset the
student movement, mimicking political polarization on the national level, the strength of the
ties between students and the working class underwent change, as well.
Observing the cycles of mobilization and dormancy that characterized the early
history of the FECh and that have persisted into the present day, Bonilla and Glazer attribute
such a pattern to the natural turnover of leadership. The ebb and flow of cycles of contention,
they add, is “more directly tied to a basic rhythm of action and reaction, of movement from
extreme political activism and externally directed operations toward political moderation and
a reversal of attention to university affairs.”69 If the movement lay dormant by the middle of
the century, another effervescent moment would occur during Salvador Allende’s short-lived
presidency.

Left and Right Take to the Streets under Allende’s Unidad Popular
In the 1960s, a nationwide university reform movement emerged that would last
through Allende’s presidency. This time, change began with the FEUC and not the FECh.
Students mobilized to modernize and democratize their university, granting greater
representation for students. Students also demanded greater autonomy from the Catholic
Church and fought for social justice more broadly. The Catholic University-led reform
challenged the FECh’s longstanding hegemony as the student movement became less
centralized. While still the largest student organization, the FECh was no longer the center of
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the movement as the Catholic Universities of Santiago and Valparaiso, as well as the
Universidad de Concepción, gained ascendancy.
Garretón and Martínez suggest that the reform emerged from the Catholic universities
because of “sus estructuras más tradicionales, en la doctrina de la Iglesia que en estos años se
torna más preocupada por la labor social de las universidades, o, en la menor participación
que tenían los partidos políticos, que permitió un movimiento más espontáneo.”70 The FEUC
was also likely emboldened by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, who was elected
president in 1964. Promising a “Revolution in Liberty,” Frei committed himself to social
justice, the nationalization of copper, and agrarian reform. Even as the Reform demanded
changes to the university, Garretón and Martínez argue:
La Reforma no fue percibida por los estudiantes como un problema meramente
corporativo. Ella pasó a ser, de algún modo, la tarea antioligárquica de los estudiantes
al poner a la Universidad al servicio de una sociedad en proceso de cambio. Los
problemas nacionales y el anhelo de justicia social, junto también al deseo de
modernizar la universidad, fue nuevamente lo que guió al movimiento estudiantil.71
As this Reform demonstrated, the student movement still maintained its anti-oligarchical
roots and advocated for broader societal changes, even when directed by a more centrist
party like the Christian Democrats.
At the same time, a reinvigorated movement within the FECh threw its support
behind Allende’s bid for the presidency and helped bring his UP coalition to a narrow victory
in 1970. Students maintained a close relationship with Allende’s government, while
simultaneously maintaining their independence. Unlike their predecessors, the students that
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mobilized during Allende’s administration did not emerge from a network of social
organizing with the working and popular classes. As Pinto Vallejos and Salazar explain, “el
liderazgo revolucionario de 1970 tuvo una raigambre social débil y superficial, precisamente
por su origen estudiantil y juvenil. No fue un liderazgo surgido desde las bases populares:
necesitaba implantarse en ellas.”72 As the previous half decade had shown, however, this was
not uncommon; the links between students and laborers endured, but fluctuated regularly
between superficiality and close collaboration.
The student movement within the UP also differed from its older iteration as it was
more pragmatic and less rhetorical. Out of the universities’ new political landscapes emerged
numerous organizations, such as the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and the
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU).73 The MIR was formed at the Universidad
de Concepción in 1965, reaching its height in 1973 before being severely repressed under the
dictatorship. These leftist organizations and loose ties with labor cultivated a strong sense of
poder popular, found in the “cordones industrials, los consejos campesinos, los commandos
comunales y las asambleas del pueblo.”74 This new form of solidarity enabled the popular
classes, including students, to take decision making into their own hands, unleashing a
revolution from below.75
Under Allende, the streets became the political stage for political actors on the left,
right, and center, who occupied urban space through marches and seizures of factories,
schools and the streets. Through these occupations, Trumper argues, citizens “could redefine
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what it meant to be allendistas or anti-allendistas and…could politicize the categories and
identities of poblador, worker, middle-class entrepreneur, housewife, or artist in new
ways.”76 Pinto Vallejos and Salazar expand upon this fight for control of the streets, or what
they refer to as “ganar la calle,” acknowledging that this was often done through violent
means.77
The UP also saw the entrance of women in the political sphere, but as Carrie Endries
notes, it was “only urban, upper middle and upper class women [who] were able to take
advantage of” the opened political arena.78 In particular, middle class women played a key
role in redefining political activism in the public sphere as they left their houses and banged
pots in the streets to call attention to food shortages. These cacerolazos challenged who could
participate in politics and where this participation could occur, heralding “the public
appearance of a women’s opposition movement.”79 With these protests, middle and upper
class women “attempt[ed] to reclaim city streets from Allende supporters, reimagine public
space as a site of oppositional practice, and thereby redefine the terms and limits of urban
politics.”80 Taking to the streets in cacerolazos, these women redefined motherhood and
politicized previously apolitical, domestic spaces.
While scholarship on the changing role of women during Allende’s brief rule largely
neglects the role of university women, it is still useful in understanding how protest and
political subjectivity changed under the UP. Soon enough, the protest from women of the
right would help to completely change Chile’s political landscape. Though women and men
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alike would quickly lose their political voices under the next sixteen years of military rule,
new actors continued to carve out space in the public sphere and embrace their newfound
political identity.

Resistance under Dictatorship
On September 11, 1973, a military coup ended Allende’s socialist revolution
prematurely, ushering in sixteen years of censorship, repression, and torture. However, the
dictatorship did not erase the past half century of organizing, but rather forced the student
movement to change their tactics and operate clandestinely until mass protest erupted again
in 1983. As the popular classes took to the streets once again, women from the left played an
important role in denouncing the abuses of the dictatorship, reclaiming and reimagining their
political identities, much like conservative women had during Allende’s presidency.
In addition to disbanding student federations, Pinochet created the Federación de
Centros de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECECh) in 1978, in an attempt to limit
organizing and to co-opt university students. The FECECh hoped to “depoliticize student
elections by narrowing the range of candidates to those in one’s own department.”81
Pinochet’s plan backfired, however, as the Christian Democrats, Communists, and Socialists
won representation within the organization. As Schneider observes, “[s]tudents had used the
government’s attempts to coopt the movement to reclaim the democratic spaces closed by the
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coup.”82 This statist organization was eventually dissolved in 1984, the same year that the
FECh was reconstituted with renewed force.
After the dissolution of the FECh and other student federations in 1973, students had
to find new ways to organize under dictatorship. This often took the form of cultural groups
and institutions, such as art collectives or music groups. Within these collectives, students
“held short rallies to protest high education fees, the presence of repressive agents in the
universities, and, more generally, military intervention in academic life.”83 In the first decade
of the dictatorship, however, these protests were often erratic and lacked direction and
cohesion.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this cultural opposition served as a foundation out
of which the leftist parties reemerged. As Pinto Vallejos and Salazar note: “La observación
cuidadosa de la ‘transición juvenil’ (y ciudadana) del período 1976-1983 muestra que los
partidos de Izquierda (el P.C., el MIR y el MAPU, principalmente) reflotaron sobre la
marejada juvenil y cultural de fines de los ’70, y no al revés.”84 Aesthetic and cultural
production in the 1970s thus characterized the clandestine student movement and also gave
rise to the leftist mobilizations that erupted in 1983.
Indeed, activism operated mostly in an underground fashion until May 11, 1983,
when the Copper Workers’ Confederation led a national strike that triggered three years of
near-monthly mobilizations.85 Prior to these mobilizations, anti-regime “protests took the
form of fasts, hunger strikes, and quick, limited public rallies” against government abuses.86
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Though organized by copper workers, this strike had widespread appeal, which Garretón
attributes to three factors: “[I]ts multiclass base, the involvement of Chile’s most powerful
union, and stress on broadly based defiance rather than more limited work-based strikes.”87
The ensuing protests galvanized workers, students, and pobladores alike. Unsurprisingly, it
was this joint show of force between labor and students that dealt one of the strongest blows
to the dictatorship.
Although it was copper workers who initiated the protest, a ravaged union rank-andfile played a diminished role in the oppositional movement throughout the 1980s. As
Pinochet systematically repressed and silenced the political left, new spaces opened up for
dissent in Santiago’s shantytowns in what scholars acknowledge as the transition from the
“classes to masses.”88 Young pobladores especially distrusted government negotiation and
were not afraid to “express themselves more aggressively than had the middle and organized
working classes.”89 The mobilizations between 1983-1986 also adopted an expressive,
carnivalesque spirit, harkening back to less politically-charged mobilizations of previous
decades and suggesting that perhaps students were not as fearful of the repercussions of their
actions.90
Schneider acknowledges the historic role that these communities have played and
credits their community solidarity to early grassroots organizing led by the Communist Party:
“The capacity of Santiago’s poor urban neighborhoods to mobilize mass political resistance,
despite a decade of severe military repression, lay in the political heritage of decades of work
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in the popular culture and in the formation of a skilled generation of grassroots militants.”91
Dating back to the 1920s, poor urban neighborhoods were radicalizing points of contact
between students and laborers. This time, however, peripheral shantytown pobladores
became protagonists under the dictatorship and helped to revive the left.
Popular class women also were central actors under Pinochet. Through the formation
of popular economic organizations (organizaciones económicas populares, or OEPs) that
provided community aid such as public health or soup kitchens, these female pobladores
created a collective identity that fought against structural patriarchal oppression. The
proliferation of OEPs also challenged the division between public and private spheres “by
moving formerly private domestic work into public, collective space and community.”92
Ollas communes, for example, became imbued with political meaning as women gathered in
collective spaces to share food and organize. Politicizing their motherhood and domestic
work, women reimagined themselves as political actors.
By the late 1980s, the fervor had begun to die down. In 1987, massive student
protests led to the overthrow of the Universidad de Chile’s rector, José Luis Federici,
marking the climax of the student mobilization in this decade.93 Students had expelled
Pinochet’s appointee and were reclaiming the university for themselves. This would be the
final outburst for the student movement in this era.
Since 1906, these cycles of mobilization and silence permeated Chile’s political
landscape and correlated with similar peaks and valleys in labor organization and leftist
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politics more broadly. With each cycle, the student movement drew upon old tactics,
ideologies, and alliances with the working class, bringing new actors into its fold. This first
period in the movement’s history saw an evolving political ideology, moving from a
bohemian anarchism to a growing leftism throughout the 1920s. Coming in and out of close
contact with the working and popular classes, students provided an oppositional critique that
found common cause with the masses.
With the return to democracy in 1990, however, the student movement would no
longer be working in opposition to the government, contributing to a surprising
depoliticization of the movement. As the first eighty-five years of the student movement
showed, however, there was never a complete nor enduring silence; this next period of
dormancy, too, would eventually come to an end as students again took to the streets.
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Chapter II
The Penguin Revolution
No tienen miedo, y luchan por un pase escolar gratuito. Son niños que no tienen
memoria de la dictadura del general Augusto Pinochet. Estos escolares no tienen los
temores de sus padres, como tampoco la gratitud de ser libres de la tiranía.94
El Mercurio, June 2006
In 1988, civil society and political parties from the center and left banded together to
form the Concertación de Partidos por el No (Coalition of Parties for the No).95 In a
resounding victory, the “No” galvanized mass support and put an end to military rule,
mandating a presidential election in 1990.96 While the campaign for the No represented a
mass mobilization of society, the electoral campaign contributed to a fifteen year “silencing”
of political activism. Ironically, social movements diminished after the return to democracy,
as the center-left Concertación governments that held power for the first twenty years
following Pinochet’s defeat actively sought to limit popular mobilizations in order to keep a
tenuous democracy intact. Moreover, Concertación governments maintained the neoliberal
policies put in place under Pinochet, exacerbating Chile’s growing socioeconomic divide.
After fifteen years of relative quiescence, mounting discontent with the effects of
neoliberal restructuring would reach a breaking point during Bachelet’s first term as
president. Protests erupted in 2006 as high school students led a series of nationwide strikes
and school occupations. While previous years saw periodic student mobilizations, the
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Penguin Revolution was the largest protest since the fall of the dictatorship. Over more than a
month of occupations, demonstrations, and government negotiations, students attacked
Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy head on, making educational reform a national concern. While
students won some minor concessions, such as a free bus pass and the eventual repeal of the
Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (LOCE), the Penguin Revolution did little to
change Chile’s for-profit education system.
Why did the movement reemerge in full force at this historical moment? As the
epigraph from El Mercurio attests, the Pingüinos were a generation sin miedo. Coming of age
under democracy, these students did not have the same fear of repression as their parents.
Furthermore, Bachelet campaigned with the promise of a more participatory democracy.
Students took this to heart, challenging her administration and forcing the government to
address their demands.
The Penguin Revolution also brought together public and private high school students
with university students, teachers, and families—by no means a homogeneous alliance. The
multiple visions within the movement, their differing tactics and strategies, and debates
around whether or not to negotiate with the government revealed a divided student
movement. Ultimately, internal tensions and the lack of a coherent vision caused the
movement to crumble. Although the Penguin Revolution did not win all of its demands, the
size and mass appeal of the mobilizations was a tremendous victory for what had become a
dormant, demobilized movement, refocusing national attention on the pernicious effects of
neoliberal reform.
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Demobilization in the Return to Democracy
As civil society coalesced to overthrow the dictatorship in 1988, the potential for
alternative forms of political activism was diminished. As mentioned in Chapter 1, under
military rule, pobladores had played a key role in community organizing under military rule,
especially through popular economic organizations. However, political scientist Philip
Oxhorn argues that during the campaign for the No, “[p]olitical party militants were
reassigned to voter registration and campaign-related activities, and the leaders of popular
organizations who did not belong to political parties often volunteered to help as well.”97
With their focus diverted towards national electoral goals, these leaders could no longer
engage in autonomous, radical politics that directly benefitted the popular classes.
But demobilization was not solely a result of the activists’ redirected focus; the
Concertación administrations’ twenty-year rule actively sought to contain discontent from the
popular classes and students. Fearful of a coup and protective of its newborn democracy,
these politicians were far more cautious than their radical predecessors in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. They portrayed “an image of moderation, conciliation, and pragmatism.”98
Furthermore, the transition to democracy was spearheaded by the political elite, not the
popular classes. It was thus in the interest of the ruling class to limit dissent to protect the
terms of the negotiated transition. Working within Pinochet’s constitutional framework,
Paley writes that “the political transition would proceed not through the activity of broadbased social movements but through a series of negotiations among elites, ironed out within
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the military’s constitutional framework.”99 This transition and adherence to Pinochet’s
constitution determined the permissible forms of democracy and activism moving forward.
Thus, top-down, moderate change effectively limited the parameters of popular
organization under democracy. As Oxhorn notes, “[t]he elitist nature of the transition
required that the demands of all segments of Chilean society be moderated and their political
participation managed by political elites within the limits of the electoral process.”100 Popular
sector organizing was considered a threat to the political class’ conciliatory agenda. Fearful
that popular class uprisings would undo Chile’s fragile democracy, the Concertación
administrations obligated citizens “to support the government and its actions because to do
otherwise was to invite what was considered the only other alternative: authoritarian rule.”101
This binary left little room for people to negotiate or engage in their own form of politics. In
this limited arena, the popular sectors were confined to the Concertación’s vision of electoral
politics, inhibiting these sectors from pursuing “alternative forms of political
participation.”102
Furthermore, many Concertación elites supported the economic model instituted
under Pinochet. “Their project of sustaining the economic model was premised on keeping
both labor and neighborhood social movements—groups that might create demands for
housing, public services, or higher wages—in check,”103 Paley contends. Leaving intact the
political and economic reforms from the dictatorship, the Concertación’s twenty-year rule
exacerbated socioeconomic inequality. If the negotiated transition limited the potential for
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political activism, it also fomented discontent with Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, this dissatisfaction would primarily revolve around the privatization
of education, paving the way for the largest mobilizations since the return to democracy.

Post-Transition Silence and the Reemergence of the Student Left
The demobilizing effects of the negotiated transition were also felt within the student
movement, which experienced a period of quiescence following the last major protests in the
late 1980s. Though minor protests surfaced nearly every year, students were unable to
generate or sustain a mass movement until 2006. In fact, with some exceptions, these fifteen
years have attracted little attention from scholars. Thielemann Hernández provides one of the
few thorough accounts of student mobilizations during this period, arguing against the grain
that there was, in fact, such a movement.104
Like the popular sector at large, the students also acceded to political realities at the
end of the dictatorship. Abandoning their autonomous fight, they embraced the objectives of
the electoral campaign, draining their energy and organizing capacity in the process.
Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted a crisis of confidence in the Chilean
left.
The student movement receded once civilian rule had returned. As Thielemann
Hernández argues, students had mobilized against the regime itself, not the policies enacted
under dictatorship. Once students and civil society had overthrown Pinochet and restored
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democracy, the movement no longer had a clear objective, as students lost sight of the need
for internal university reforms during the electoral campaign.105 The movement also lost
steam throughout the 1990s as a result of internal crises, particularly within the FECh.106
As the movement gradually lost its footing throughout the 1990s, its demands were
constrained by the neoliberal framework. Calling for an arancel diferenciado (sliding scale
fee), for instance, did little to alter the neoliberal structures behind university fees.107 As
Thielemann Hernández argues, “[l]a idea de ‘gratuidad’, que incluía un cuestionamiento más
profundo al autofinanciamiento y al régimen de mercado, es desplazada entonces por una
aproximación más posibilista.”108 By accepting the neoliberal framework as a fait accompli,
students had little space to make more radical demands or attack the underlying structural
issues.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the movement also zeroed in on university
democratization, calling for greater student representation in decision making processes.
Under the dictatorship, most of the power was given to rectors and other administrators. With
attention focused primarily on democratization and university financing, the movement
reverted to a corporatist focus that failed to extrapolate structural critiques encompassing
broader social grievances.
If the 1990s were characterized by relatively dormant student federations, the decade
also saw the beginnings of a revival of a militant student left. This reconstituted left “pudo
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romper con los límites del viejo movimiento estudiantil (pequeño, muy elitario [sic] y
fuertemente determinado por las necesidades de la pequeña política tradicional).”109
Experimenting with political autonomy and horizontal forms of governance through
colectivos and asambleas, this new movement represented a significant break from the elitist
nature of past student politics. The movement also began to turn away from demands
centered around students’ interests, instead drawing its demands from the base of society.
But even as the movement drew upon widespread discontent and levied broader critiques, it
still remained relatively siloed and failed to create strong ties with popular sectors.
In 1997, the FECh led the decade’s largest protests. Those demonstrations were not
an explosion, but rather the consequence of steadily increasing discontent. Students took over
schools with tomas and paros in protest against the Ley Marco de Universidades Estatales, a
university financing law. At the national level, university students protested the Ley Marco
and the LOCE, arguing that these laws promoted the privatization of education. The LOCE,
which was introduced on the penultimate day of Pinochet’s presidency, granted greater local
control over education. This led to a stark divide between public and private schools, as
management of secondary schools was placed under the control of cash-strapped
municipalities, often with minimal federal oversight and reduced funding.
The LOCE reified neoliberal beliefs in the freedom to choose, placing educational
choices in the hands of parents to the disadvantage of families who could not afford to send
their children to subsidized or private schools. This decentralized educational system
furthered inequality and discrimination as private schools could choose who to admit, often
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taking the form of discriminatory practices. By fighting against the LOCE, students attacked
the growing privatization and decentralization of education and the resulting socioeconomic
inequalities. This fight for quality education without profit, “No al lucro,” became the
rallying cry of the Penguin Revolution.
Protests spread throughout the country, though they were felt the strongest in
Santiago, especially in the communist-led Universidad de Chile and the Universidad de
Santiago de Chile. By June, 50,000 students had mobilized across the country. Protests also
began to take on a different tone, as demonstrators employed carnivalesque tactics. Leaving
behind the more confrontational tactics of the Allende and Pinochet eras, the 1997
mobilizations represented a new way of engaging with la calle, “sin que se abandonara la
resistencia y rebeldía callejera.”110 It is important to note, however, that these more playful,
spontaneous demonstrations were not of the same magnitude as later protests, usually
mobilizing several thousand students at a time. Though the character of the mobilizations had
changed, they were modest in scale. Furthermore, the protests did not have “active support
from a broader spectrum of actors” since “the demands were centered on a specific issues
that affected public universities and the protagonists were almost exclusively public
university students.”111 They were significant in that they represented the first major clash
between social movements and the governments of the transition, a “rupture of tranquility,”
as Thielemann Hernández put it.112
While some federations achieved minor victories in the form of democratization and
funding changes, the 1997 protests did not bring about significant educational reform. They
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did, however, demonstrate the reenergized strength of the student movement. Moving beyond
the internal rebuilding of the early 1990s, the 1997 protests refocused the movement more
broadly on the educational crisis at hand, laying the groundwork for future mobilizations.
The 1997 mobilizations did not indicate a completely renewed or unified movement,
however. At the turn of the millennium, the student movement experienced internal divisions
along competing ideological lines. For example, after the 1997 protests, southern federations
broke off from the Confech to form the Confesur (Confederación de Estudiantes del Sur).
Unlike their communist counterparts who eschewed the mainstream politics, the leaders of
Confesur belonged to Concertación parties and sought to reach an agreement with the
Mineduc (Ministry of Education). The creation of Confesur did not represent a complete
rupture, but rather a parallel body expressly created by the Concertación to weaken the
communists’ influence within the Confech.113
The movement also experienced further factionalism during the Congreso Nacional
de Estudiantes (CNE), held in June 1998 in Valparaíso. Organized with the intention of
uniting students under a common platform and strengthening the Confech, ironically, the
CNE exacerbated growing divisions. The conference was “broken” when Concertación
members abstained on the final day, unwilling to concede to policies pushed forward by the
communist majority.114
With university students in disarray, high school students took center stage in 2000 in
a series of protests against transportation fee hikes soon after the Socialist Ricardo Lagos
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(2000-2006) was inaugurated. Buttressed by the restructuring of secondary school
organizations, these students created horizontal forms of leadership and participation. Up to
this point, the Asamblea de Centros de Alumnos de Santiago (ACAS) and Federación de
Estudiantes Secundarios de Santiago (FESES) had served as the main organizing bodies of
secondary students. However, the ACAS, which organized school federations based on a
decree created under military rule, came under fire for its authoritarian origin. The FESES
was highly criticized for its hierarchical structure and “its lack of an agenda on the students’
everyday life issues resulted in a low capacity to convene,”115 according to Donoso.
In 2000, the FESES was dissolved, and the Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes
Secundarios (ACES) emerged out of its ashes, bringing together students that disapproved of
the ACAS and the FESES. The ACES distanced itself from political parties and created a
more horizontal structure with assemblies and elected spokespeople that drew upon anarchist
organizing principles.116 The ACES also included representatives from colectivos sociales,
“smaller groups of students that represented the ‘inorganic’ Left.” The addition of these
informal organizations was especially important as it expanded the ACES’s membership.117
Out of this horizontal structure emerged the 2001 Mochilazo protests, named for
secondary students’ backpacks. Students demanded reduced fees for the pase escolar as well
as state control of the bus pass administration, which up to then had been in the hands of
private companies. Similar to the university movements of the preceding years, the
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Mochilazo emerged out of a growing social crisis and discontent with the state of education,
and its demands were grounded in familial grievances.
Like the protests several years earlier, the Mochilazo failed to mobilize great numbers
of secondary students. It did, however, demonstrate the growing strength and organizational
capabilities of student leaders and secondary school organizations. After several weeks of
protests, some of which mobilized up to 12,000 students, the Lagos administration
capitulated to students’ demands, committing to assume control of transportation and reduce
fees. Despite these triumphs, students were quick to offer up critiques of their movement,
admitting that “mobilizing more students for a broader agenda of education reforms was not
a feasible goal at that time.”118 While the Mochilazo did not address broader social demands,
it laid the organizational blueprint for successive secondary mobilizations.
A proposed student loan reform in 2005, the Ley de Financiamiento de la Educación
Superior, triggered another wave of protests with important consequences for the student
movement. This reform established the Créditos con Aval del Estado (State Guaranteed
Student Loans, or CAE), a loan system that made credit more available through stateguaranteed private loans, granting its administration to the free market.119 These private loans
had a much higher interest rate at 7%, which led to extremely high delinquency rates for loan
repayment.120 Mobilizing against the CAE, students attacked the deepening effects of
neoliberal restructuring by Concertación administrations.
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Though the CAE became a law later in the year, protests led to important negotiations
between the Confech and Mineduc. Tired of yearly negotiations with protestors, the
Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Educación (SEREMI of Educación) created a “more
permanent dialogue platform in 2005,”121 bringing together students from the ACAS and
ACES in weekly meetings. Even if these negotiations were not entirely successful,122 they
taught students to negotiate with government officials. This would prove essential during the
mass protests the following year. These formal negotiations, Donoso argues, “gave the
students more expertise on the problems within the education system, and this, in contrast to
the 2001 Mochilazo, made the Pingüinos movement’s demands much more focused on the
structural problems of the system as [a] whole.”123 Through these negotiations, students also
unintentionally formed social networks. Thus, after 2005, the conditions were in place for a
mass movement to emerge. Building upon widespread discontent, leaders utilized student
organizations and networks as well as their newly developed negotiation skills to challenge
the state and demand even greater reforms.

Beginnings of the Penguin Revolution
On April 24, 2006, over three thousand students occupied schools in Lota, a city in
the Concepción metropolitan area. Joined by more than two hundred professors, these
students began an indefinite toma in response to the collapse of a school roof from strong
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autumn rains. Students barricaded themselves in and slept in their schools, maintaining
physical control of the building. While the toma ended a few days later, with over sixty
students detained, 124 protests in Lota sparked mobilizations across the country. In Santiago,
4,000 students protested similar infrastructural deficiencies and the delayed delivery of the
pase escolar. Soon thereafter, the demands broadened to include a protest of the high cost of
the Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), the university entrance exam.
Within a few weeks, these protests grew into the largest mobilization since the fall of
the dictatorship. At its zenith, the movement mobilized nearly one million students. While
the Penguin Revolution is often regarded as an explosive protest that represented the
reawakening of the student movement, such an ahistorical analysis fails to consider the
sustained crescendo of student discontent over the previous decade and a half. It was,
however, a turning point, heralding the emergence of a new mass movement.

Leadership, Organizational Structure, and Demands
Like the 2005 movement, the Penguin Revolution benefitted from horizontal,
democratic governance, this time led by the Asamblea de Estudiantes Secundarios de
Santiago (AES). Formed in December 2005 from the merging of the ACES and the ACAS,
the AES “adopted the ACES’ non-hierarchical decision-making-mechanisms and model of
leadership.”125 At its helm were four student leaders, all of whom represented municipal
schools: César Valenzuela and Karina Delfino (both from the ACAS with strong ties to the

124
125

“Contra alcalde: Liceos de Lota en paro indefinido,” El Mercurio, April 27, 2006.
Donoso, “Dynamics of Change in Chile,” 9.

57

Socialist Party, which belonged to the Concertación) and Juan Carlos Herrera and María
Jesús Sanhueza (representatives from the ACES).126 The AES also included conservative
student leaders like Germán Westhoff, who was a member of the right-wing Unión
Democrática Independiente (UDI), and led the student federation of the Instituto Nacional,
Chile’s most prestigious municipal school. Such diverse leadership ultimately contributed to
the factionalization of the movement.
The AES’ horizontal structure initially broadened the movement’s political
representation, helping to increase popular support and preventing any one political party
from coopting the movement. Moreover, the incorporation of the ACES and its colectivos
sociales expanded the reach of the AES as it spread beyond the “emblematic schools,”
Chile’s top-ranked high schools based on high PSU averages. Top-tier schools, such as the
Instituto Nacional, the Confederación Suiza, and the Liceo de Aplicación, were some of the
first to mobilize.127
Initially, students made concrete demands for a free, unlimited student bus pass
(previously, the pass had been limited to two rides per day) and the waiver of PSU fees for
the lowest three quintiles. These short-term demands grew out of familial issues. Valentina
Núñez Pascual, a student at la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (PUCV),
explained:
Las primeras demandas eran pequeñas, pero eran productos de un problema
grande…las primeras cosas que salen a la vista son cosas que afectan el bolsillo, la
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plata, por ejemplo, el pase. El pase escolar es importante porque generalmente una
persona que estudia no trabaja…entonces es un gasto extra para la familia, para que
uno de sus hijos vaya al colegio…. Que sea un pase escolar que sea nacional y que
sirva…los siete días a la semana…es algo que les tocó al bolsillo de los estudiantes.
As she argued, these small demands, which affected families’ “pockets,” were not trivial, but
rather served to uncover latent structural inequalities inherited from the dictatorship. “Sirvió
de a poco para escarbar problemas que estaban ocultos y que yo considero que vienen desde
mucho, mucho antes…privatización, la municipalización de los colegios.”128 Indeed,
privatization and municipalization of education came to be the central themes of the
movement.
These concrete, short-term demands quickly expanded to more substantive, long-term
demands. These included the repeal of the LOCE and a reform of the Jornada Escolar
Completa (JEC), which mandated a full school day without dedicating sufficient resources
for extended hours, such as extracurricular activities and food rations.129 Sanhueza declared:
“[Q]ueremos que el gobierno asuma el fracaso de la Jornada Escolar Completa y actúe en
consecuencia, ya sea derogándola o inyectando los recursos que realmente funcione.”130
Dividing demands into concrete calls for larger reforms was a strategic decision intended to
mobilize students around the prospective achievement of immediate goals. If students won
the free pase escolar, for example, it was believed that there would be sufficient support and
momentum to demand a repeal of the LOCE.
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To force their agenda upon the state, students launched disruptive protests and school
occupations. This contentious repertoire captured media attention, which bolstered public
support and necessitated a response from the state. In an interview, Delfino explained: “Tú
puedes hacer una campaña masiva y repetir por qué te estás manifestando, pero nunca nadie
te va a pescar en serio hasta que conquistas a los medios de comunicación.”131 Paros, tomas,
and marches thus gave the movement added visibility, enabling students to incorporate these
larger demands as public support for the movement increased.

Escalations and Negotiations
The first major protest broke out on May 10 as thousands of students participated in a
national strike while student leaders began negotiations with government officials. Though
the protests were felt strongly in Santiago, where the meeting was held, demonstrations from
Arica in the north all the way to Punta Arenas in the extreme south demonstrated the reach of
the movement and the impressive coordination between student groups across the country.
Student leaders left negotiations that day dissatisfied with the government’s minor
concessions. As Valenzuela said, “[l]os temas más fáciles avanzaron, los más duros no
tuvieron respuestas concretas.” Students suggested that protests would continue, and
surprisingly “las autoridades no les pidieron ningún compromiso para frenar las
movilizaciones.”132 This sequence of negotiations and intensified protests would come to
characterize the movement.
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Unfavorable media coverage of the strike zeroed in on the violence and destruction
caused by the protests. El Mercurio highlighted this with provocative titles such as: “Casi mil
200 detenidos: Violencia estudiantil se sintió de norte a sur.”133 The article attributed the
violence, however, to encapuchados134 that infiltrated the protests, acknowledging that the
student leaders did not condone the violence. Questionable headlines and photographs of
hooded students smashing park benches, breaking into cars, and setting fires in the streets
only served to further the conservative paper’s one-sided narrative (See Figure 2:1). Detailed
accounts of arrests in cities throughout the country and vandalized businesses accentuated the
allegedly delinquent nature of the protests.135

Figure 2:1
Coverage from El Mercurio highlighting violence and
destruction of the May 10 demonstration. Courtesy of the AFECh.
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Other coverage sought to provoke public antipathy towards the movement by
focusing on financial losses to schools and buses affected by strikes, with headlines
proclaiming “36 mil escolares sin clases debido a conflicto estudiantil.”136 It is important to
note, however, the detrimental and divisive impact of the paros. Many students and families
had just cause to bemoan school closures; the longer the schools were occupied, the greater
the possibility students would have to repeat an academic year. For families paying for
secondary education, this meant losing money each day the strike continued. By focusing on
violence, vandalism, and lost class time, the mainstream press actively attempted to
stigmatize the movement.
To counter this negative coverage, students changed tactics, beginning a series of
occupations. On May 19, the Instituto Nacional mounted the first toma (See Figure 2:2), and
Santiago’s other emblematic high schools quickly followed suit. School occupations
provided a less confrontational alternative to “las movilizaciones callejeras que cada vez se
tornaban más violentas.”137 Conscious of the negative press coverage, students hoped that
shifting demonstrations to the schools themselves would reduce violence and change their
public image.
Mobilizations escalated in advance of Bachelet’s presidential address on May 21.
Students announced another national mobilization for May 18 in hopes that she would
acknowledge their demands. In her speech, not only did Bachelet fail to address their
concerns, she levied harsh critiques against the violence in previous protests:
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Figure 2:2
The Instituto Nacional en toma. The banner presents the movement’s main demands: “LOCE:
repeal; JEC: complete revision; municipalization: public establishments in the hands of the
state.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Instituto_Nacional_en_toma.jpg.
Quiero ciudadanos críticos, conscientes, que planteen sus ideas y sus
reivindicaciones. Pero esa crítica debe hacerse con un espíritu constructivo, con
propuestas sobre la mesa y, lo más importante, a cara descubierta y sin violencia.
Quiero ser muy clara: lo que hemos visto en semanas recientes es inaceptable. ¡No
toleraré el vandalismo, ni los destrozos, ni la intimidación a las personas! Aplicaré
todo el rigor de la ley. La democracia la ganamos con la cara descubierta y debemos
continuar con la cara descubierta.138

138

“Sus párrafos principales: Mensaje de la presidenta Michelle Bachelet,” El Mercurio, May 22, 2006.

63

Bachelet’s characterization of violent thugs unable to present their demands in “constructive”
ways furthered the narrative articulated in the mainstream media. Her failure to respond to
student concerns and her patronizing critiques backfired. Secondary students throughout the
country mounted more tomas and paros and gave the administration one week to respond to
their demands.139
Following these protests, Minister of Education Martín Zilic extended another offer to
negotiate. On May 29, however, he announced that his sub-secretary, Pilar Romaguera,
would take his place. Upset by this decision, students responded: “[Y]a no queremos hablar
con técnicos, porque las soluciones son políticas.”140 The government also limited the
number of students that could participate in the negotiations, which students cited as another
reason for their refusal to participate.141 After rejecting Zilic’s offer, students began the
largest protest since the return to democracy, mobilizing close to one million students.
Over 50,000 students took to the streets in peaceful protests in the capital, while
roughly 800,000 students joined the strike throughout the country. According to El Mercurio,
939 high schools participated in the strike, representing about 80% of the nation’s secondary
students. Private high schools also joined in, reflecting strong support for the movement
across socioeconomic backgrounds. Acknowledging their privileged status, one student
remarked: “Tenemos la suerte de vivir en una situación privilegiada, pero los jóvenes somos
el futuro de Chile y entre todos tenemos que surgir.”142 Private schools organized paros
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culturales that consisted of assemblies, “jornadas de reflexión,” and related cultural
activities. Coverage in El Mercurio was quick to note the distinctly “democratic” and
apolitical participation from private schools, who organized democratic meetings to vote on
whether or not to participate and “tuvieron especial cuidado de que el tema no se
politizara.”143 This favorable coverage reflected a clear class bias towards private school
students.
Over 100,000 university students also joined the May 30 demonstrations. Finding
common cause with the Pingüinos’ demands, they acknowledged that “las demandas de los
‘pingüinos’ son parte de la reforma integral a la educación que ellos también han solicitado al
Gobierno.”144 The participation of private university students alongside students from
Santiago’s traditional universities indicated a significant expansion of the movement.
Even though the demonstrations were mostly peaceful, protestors were met with
police repression. Santiago saw disproportionally high arrests compared to other regions,
with 619 students arrested in the metropolitan region and only 111 arrested in the other
regions combined. In a surprising shift in tone, El Mercurio acknowledged the excessive
force used by police in Santiago. A furious Sanhueza contended: ‘El Gobierno está asustado
por lo que ha sido la organización estudiantil y quieren frenarla como sea.”145 Another
student echoed this brutality in RBP: “El mayor paro de la educación desde, al menos, la UP
[Unidad Popular], con cientos de miles de adherentes a la revolución liderada por los
secundarios, tuvo por contraparte la vergüenza de la acción de Carabineros, con su represión
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y violencia digna de un estado de sitio.”146 As the mobilizations gained force, repression
intensified.
While students marched along the Alameda, Santiago’s central artery, leaders met
inside the Biblioteca Nacional, this time with Zilic in attendance. The Ministry made a few
minor concessions, offering a free PSU and pase escolar for the lowest three quintiles.147 Not
surprisingly, students rejected these modest demands. In a televised address the next day,
Bachelet announced the creation of the Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de la
Educación (Advisory Commission on the Quality of Education, or CAP) to focus on longerterm demands, primarily reforms to the LOCE, JEC, and the de-municipalization of schools.
In a more conciliatory speech, Bachelet again emphasized student participation, consistent
with her campaign promises of a more participatory democracy:
Pero quiero, particularmente, invitar a los estudiantes a participar. Ustedes han puesto
el tema al medio del debate de la sociedad. Las energías que ustedes han mostrado y
que ha despertado este movimiento no se puede perder. Queremos recoger todo lo
valioso de sus planteamientos para hacer de la educación, una educación mucho
mejor, de mayor calidad.148
With a new infrastructure for negotiations in place, the government sought to co-opt the
movement.
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The government’s partial concessions and the creation of the CAP left student leaders
in a quandary: should they continue with paros and tomas or resume negotiations? El
Mercurio accentuated the discord within the movement, pitting statements of student leaders
against one another. A case in point was an article noting that Delfino “repetía que la oferta
del Gobierno era ‘una clara victoria de los estudiantes’. Pero bastó que llegara otra dirigente,
María Huerta, para que contradijera a Delfino, afirmando que sólo se trataba de ‘una victoria
a medias.’”149 This effort to sow divisions within the student leadership, together with
generalized fatigue and a lack of “a common agenda for reform,”150 undermined the
movement’s cohesion.
Despite Bachelet’s proposals, many schools decided to continue en paro. In a radio
address on June 3, she held her ground and stated that the government had done all that it
could. Once again, Bachelet adopted a rather condescending tone, denouncing student
vandalism and destruction: “Yo sé que en democracia todo el mundo tiene derecho a
movilizarse, y si lo hacen debe ser en forma seria, responsable y debe evitarse caer en
vandalismos. Así como me parece que no es posible que haya violencia y abuso por parte de
las Fuerzas de Orden y de Seguridad, tampoco es aceptable, y no vamos a aceptar, el
vandalismo.” While Bachelet welcomed further proposals from students, she disingenuously
remarked “ya no estamos en proceso de negociación.”151 The firmness and finality of this
final statement was clearly at odds with her earlier pledge of a more participatory democracy.
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Divisions and Demobilization
On June 5, a general strike would increase tensions within the movement that
ultimately fractured the leadership and brought an end to the mobilizations. Despite appeals
from student leaders for a peaceful “paro social,” the strike was again tainted by isolated, yet
rather extreme, cases of violence. Incidents of violence exploded throughout the city center,
particularly along the Alameda. These acts were attributed to the Frente Patriótico Manuel
Rodríguez, a radical leftist group infamous for its use of violent direct action. Other cities
held peaceful riots, however, demonstrating the largely nonviolent nature of the movement.
Valparaíso, for example, saw the largest protest that day outside of Santiago with over
15,000 high school students, university students, and teachers in attendance.152
Negotiations on June 5 confirmed the participation of student leaders in the CAP,
which the government hoped “podría poner fin a más de un mes de conflicto entre los
estudiantes secundarios con el Gobierno.” As Senator Mariano Ruiz-Esquide, president of
the Senate’s Education Committee noted: “[L]o más importante fue que el Gobierno está
disponible para que los jóvenes secundarios participen en el Consejo Asesor Presidencial, en
una fórmula adecuada, junto a los profesores, universitarios y los apoderados.” Redirecting
conversations to formal negotiations around a table in an “appropriate form,” the CAP sought
to demobilize the Penguin Revolution. For the government, students’ willingness to
participate in the Commission “podría poner fin al conflicto, pero no a la crisis
educacional.”153 That is, the government hoped that these negotiations would bring an end to

Molina, “Movilización de secundarios: Marchas masivas y a la vez pacíficas hubo en regiones,” El
Mercurio, June 6, 2006.
153
Zúñiga and Pablo Reed, “Inminente salida a conflicto estudiantil con el gobierno: Senado logra acuerdo con
los secundarios,” El Mercurio, June 6, 2006.
152

68

the immediate conflict, even if it realized that it would not resolve the greater educational
crisis.
The June 5 protest also led to the resignation of two key student leaders: Valenzuela
and Delfino, whose ties to the Concertación made them more moderate than their fellow
leaders. According to a report in El Mercurio, “César Valenzuela, reconocido en muchos
sectores por su sensatez, pues dejó tal rol justo cuando la dilatación del conflicto se hacía
patente en estos últimos días.”154 Describing Valenzuela as “wise,” the paper revealed a clear
bias that pitted Valenzuela and Delfino against their more leftist counterparts. Furthermore,
on the day of the scheduled strike, El Mercurio published a short article on Sanhueza,
criticizing her abysmal school attendance and blaming her communist ties for the
radicalization of the movement and students’ rejection of government concessions. “Ella
participa en las Juventudes Comunistas, lo que para muchos es el factor que explica el afán
de ‘alargar el conflicto’ hasta lo máximo, sin reconocer la oferta del Gobierno.”155 It was
likely not a coincidence that this article was published the day of the strike; it was an obvious
attempt to villainize one of the movement’s leaders and to capitalize upon its growing
fissures.
Many schools decided to end paros and return to classes following the June 5 protest,
signaling the end of the mobilizations. The ACES, however, voted to continue with tomas
and paros, demanding greater student representation in the CAP.156 While the media
certainly presented a skewed perception of the divisions within the movement, it was not
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completely inaccurate. By this point, tensions ran high at schools such as the Instituto
Nacional, whose representatives had voted to continue en paro. After twenty-two days,
however, students there voted to end their occupation, signaling “el desplome definitivo del
movimiento estudiantil.”157 By June 12, the majority of high schools had resumed classes,
leaving only a handful of “rebel” schools still on strike.158
Tilly and Tarrow help to make sense of this fissure between those who wanted to
enter negotiations and those who voted to maintain mobilizations. “Masses of ordinary
people who erupt into the streets and out of the factories are eventually discouraged by the
repression, boredom, and desire for a routine life that eventually affects most protestors,”
they write. “Those who lead them respond in one of two opposing ways: [institutionalization
and radicalization].”159 Facing repression and burnout, many leaders viewed
institutionalization as their best bet, while the more radical leaders, such as Sanhueza and
Herrera, opted for a more confrontational approach.

Conclusion
Two key factors help explain why the Penguin Revolution emerged at this historical
juncture. First of all, these students had come to maturity under democracy, unlike their
predecessors who lived with the fear of repression and were unable to openly organize. As an
editorial in RBP writes: “Estos estudiantes no tienen el trauma de los adultos con el conflicto
social, pero fundamentalmente son la más clara expresión de la desigualdad social que hoy
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padecemos y que ha sido generada por el modelo educativo y económico.”160 Out of this
generational fearlessness, Cummings argues that students had formed a “collective identity
that united students and motivated them to take protest action.”161
This collective student identity and infrastructural support enabled the movement’s
success. As Tarrow explains, “[c]ontention crystallizes challenges into a social movement
when it taps into embedded social networks and connective structures and produces vivid
collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention against powerful
opponents.”162 Part of a “generación sin miedo,” these secondary students embraced this
politicized identity to place demands upon the state.
This generational theory alone cannot explain why protests emerged under Bachelet,
however. Her promises for greater participation created a political opening that invited
students to engage with the state in ways not seen during the previous Concertación
administrations. Given this opportunity, students pressed for bottom-up participation,
rejecting her more limited offer for negotiations with the leadership. Donoso writes: “The
rise of the Pingüinos provided an excellent opportunity to scrutinize whether the government
would keep its promise and put Bachelet’s ‘bottom-up’ discourse into practice.”163 As
students quickly realized, her vision for participation was confined to technocratic
negotiations expressly designed to limit student input. In response, they crafted their own
vision of what political participation should look like, forcing the state to address their
agenda.
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If the Penguin Revolution represented the reawakening of the student movement, it
did have its limitations. For example, unlike some of its predecessors, it never made an effort
to engage with the popular classes. Even though the demands of the mobilization were based
on familial grievances, the movement was largely confined to the schools themselves. And
though mainstream media attention brought the movement to the public’s eyes, the students
failed to capitalize on this and mobilize civil society more broadly. Matilde Méndez del
Canto, who served as the general secretary of the FECh in 2017, describes the movement’s
shortcomings:
[E]n 2006 tuvo harta cobertura, pero… era sólo de los estudiantes secundarios y la
que se decía cuando participaron los profesores o participaron otras organizaciones es
que se colgaban de los secundarios. Nunca parecía legítimo que participaran ningunos
otros con los secundarios, entonces estaban muy aislados, que los universitarios
tampoco eran parte del 2006, sólo los secundarios. Entonces por eso fue más agotado
y no tuvo el alcance de todo el año. Fue relevante porque sí fue un gran movilización
después de muchos años u organizada, etcétera, pero no fue en unidad con los otros
actores, no lo fue.164
Though the 2006 mobilizations failed to galvanize Chilean society, this would change in the
next, even larger, wave of mobilizations in 2011.
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Chapter III
The Chilean Winter
Minutos antes de llegar a Alameda 1058, se escuchaba en la caravana “la toma va, la toma
va”. Al llegar a la Alameda, la alternativa era una sola…. Algunos estudiantes trataron de
abrir la puerta principal, otros se metieron por el patio que da a San Diego. Desde allí
quebraron un vidrio para poder ingresar al edificio y abrir la puerta principal al centenar de
personas que aguardaba en el frontis. Una vez abierta la puerta, la gente se agolpó para
entrar. El hall de Casa Central se encontraba colmado de estudiantes que gritaban
“Universidad de Chile, libre y gratis”. La Casa recibía con ecos a sus nuevos inquilinos.165
RBP, July 2011
An enormous banner reading “educación pública gratuita y de calidad” hung from the
bright yellow façade of the Casa Central of the University de Chile, the most emblematic
university building in the country (See Figure 3:1). Students had occupied the building. This
occupation, which would last from June through December 2011, was only one of hundreds
of strikes and occupations that came to define the Chilean Winter. Calling for free, quality
public education, university students once again brought education reform to the public’s
attention.
Emerging five years after the Penguin Revolution, the Chilean Winter built upon the
limited victories but successful tactics and demands of their predecessors. This time,
however, university students took center stage and demanded sweeping educational reform.
Moving beyond the concrete demands for free bus passes and university entrance exams,
students called for a complete restructuring of their education system, reflecting broad
discontent with Chile’s “neoliberal miracle.”
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Figure 3:1
The cover page of an issue of RBP shows the
Universidad de Chile’s emblematic Casa Central en
toma. Courtesy of the AFECh.

Through innovative tactics, such as flash mobs and other street interventions, the 2011
movement reached a much wider audience, bringing the popular classes into the fold and
mobilizing millions of Chileans. While these mobilizations resonated with a broader public
and also fed off momentum from coterminous environmental and indigenous movements, the
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movement was not victorious. Mobilizing against Sebastián Piñera, Chile’s first elected
right-wing leader in over fifty years, students were brutally repressed and only achieved
minor victories. Plummeting approval ratings for Piñera and rising approval ratings for the
movement, however, reflected less tangible victories of the Chilean Winter (See Figure 3:2).
Once again, the student movement refocused national attention on education and the
deepening inequalities of neoliberalism. And yet again, the movement fell prey to the
cyclical nature of mobilizations, coming to a close with the onset of the summer vacation.
This time, however, the movement reached an even greater audience and had a more
enduring impact on the future of Chilean education.
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Figure 3:2
Approval ratings from March 2010 through November 2011. Data from Adimark GfK,
http://www.adimark.cl/estudios/documentos/011_ev_gob_nov011_.pdf.
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Aftermath of the Penguin Revolution
A photograph of Bachelet holding hands and smiling alongside Minister of Education
Yasna Provsote and members of La Alianza, Chile’s right-wing coalition, provoked an
uproar among students. Taken after government leaders sent the Ley General de Educación
(LGE) to Parliament, this photograph both signified the end of the LOCE and the
continuation of Pinochet’s neoliberal education policies, the result of a bipartisan
compromise.
The LGE came as a direct result of pressure from the Penguin Revolution to abolish
the LOCE. However, the LGE, enacted in November 2009, did little to change Chilean
education; rather, it allowed for gradual changes to the deeply entrenched neoliberal system.
The law created stricter regulations for particulares subvencionados, private schools
receiving state subsidies, and also mandated that high schools could only be supported by
non-profit corporations.166 Students expressed skepticism with the new proposal, arguing that
private and subsidized high schools rebranded as “non-profit corporations” would not inhibit
corporations from reaping profit from these institutions. An article in RBP stated: “Nuestra
opinión es que simplemente el Estado no puede entregar dinero a empresas privadas, sino
que debe dirigirlo a la educación pública. Si empresas privadas quieren lucrar, que lo hagan,
pero pagando sus impuestos y sin usar recursos públicos.”167 If the replacement of the LOCE
indicated a victory for the 2006 student movement, the LGE did little to challenge Pinochet’s
profiteering model.
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After 2006, protests revolved around the LGE and the Concertación’s piecemeal
reforms. As Patricia “Paty” Ibarra Sánchez, an UPLA alumna who entered university in
2006, recalls:
[S]eguimos haciendo crítica porque la reforma si bien se reformó, pero nosotros
decimos que “la LOCE maquillada.” Solo se cambiaron algunos aspectos de forma,
pero no de fondo…Y que después nosotros eso lo utilicemos como argumento en
2011 porque…se sigue viendo la educación como una educación de mercado.168
Referring to the LGE as the “LOCE with makeup,” Ibarra echoes other criticism challenging
the limited scope of this reform.
Throughout 2007, protests also began to address issues that affected the popular
classes. In particular, students mobilized around the premature implementation of the
Transantiago, Santiago’s public transportation system. Partially owned by private operators,
the Transantiago was considered a fiasco due to its long waits and poor services. Students
demonstrated an understanding that this was an issue that affected not just themselves, but
the broader society. In an article advertising a march on April 4, RBP wrote, “creemos que no
será posible salir de esta crisis si no se incluye la opinión del mundo social, sector que casi en
su totalidad es usuario del Transantiago.”169 Posters advertising this march depict a penguin,
the emblem of the 2006 movement, straddling a Transantiago bus, its arm in the air in an act
of defiance (See Figure 3:3). Demanding “más dignidad y menos negocio privado en el
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Figure 3:3
Poster advertising a march on April 4, 2007,
against the Transantiago. Courtesy of the AFECh.
transporte,” students sought to incorporate broader societal demands into the movement
while fighting against the privatization of social services.
Although students continued to protest the Transantiago, the LGE, and the precarious
state of the education system, these protests failed to receive the same traction as the 2006
protests for several reasons. First, many of the organizational structures that supported the
Penguin Revolution had disintegrated after 2006. Additionally, most of the leaders had
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graduated and entered university, many of them leaving behind their activist careers. Finally,
protests from 2007-2010 failed to receive the same media attention that the 2006
mobilizations garnered, largely because they were unable to mobilize the same magnitude of
students. Towards the end of 2010, however, mounting pressure from other social
movements and the election of Piñera would bring the student movement to the forefront of
Chilean society once again. 170

Precursor to the Chilean Winter
On February 27, 2010, an earthquake and tsunami struck the central coast of Chile.
This 8.8 earthquake, the second largest in Chile’s history, devastated coastal communities
and cities and claimed over 500 lives. Bachelet, nearing the end of her term, came under fire
for her inefficient relief efforts. In particular, she was hesitant to deploy troops in areas
affected by the disaster, fearing that militarization would unearth traumas of the Pinochet
era.171 Students rushed to fill the void created by the state, and, in turn, their relief efforts
bolstered public support for their incipient movement.
Volunteer efforts had long been central foci of student federations since the founding
of the FECh in 1906. In this instance, these efforts also served to strengthen student
federations and lift them out of their dormant state. As Figueroa noted, “La reactivación del
voluntariado, ahora como preocupación permanente…permitió ensayar formas de trabajo que
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revivieron la participación estudiantil.” 172 A poster for a protest organized by the Confech on
July 1 illustrates the incorporation of earthquake relief into the movement’s platform (See
Figure 3:4). A student holds a sign with a list of demands, among which reads “ayuda
urgente del estado para los estudiantes damnificados por el terremoto.” University students’
response to this disaster thus reenergized the movement and imbued the university
federations with a sense of communal solidarity that carried into 2011.

Figure 3:4
Poster for a march on June 1, 2010, incorporating
demands following the 2010 earthquake that
devastated central Chile. Courtesy of the AFECh.
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The Chilean Winter also drew momentum from environmental and indigenous protests
in southern Chile. At the beginning of that year, proposals for decreased gas subsidies
triggered unrest in Magallanes, Chile’s southernmost region, leading to the seizure of the
Punta Arenas airport and the paralysis of the city. In February, environmentalists and
Mapuche communities mobilized against HidroAysén, a multinational hydroelectric project
that posed significant threats to ecosystems and indigenous land rights. Activists blockaded
roads and protested for several months. While these issues arose in the south, Santiaguinos
mobilized around these issues, too, reflecting national opposition to the project.173
Finally, public scrutiny around predatory lending further politicized civil society and
drew attention to the disparate impacts of neoliberal policies. La Polar, a department store
targeted at a lower-income clientele, came under fire for illegally refinancing customer loans
at “exorbitant rates without credit holders’ knowledge.”174 Del Campo argues that the
controversy surrounding La Polar helped spark the 2011 mobilizations “as families were
reminded of the dangers of consumer credit debt and the world of usury practices.”175 By
early 2011, protests and calls for greater transparency fomented anti-government sentiment
that the student movement would capitalize upon in the following months.

Mobilizing under a Right-Wing Presidency
In 2010, the billionaire Piñera of the Renovación Nacional won the presidency. A
Harvard-educated businessman, Piñera was a fierce proponent of Pinochet’s neoliberal
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policies and supported further privatization. This political shift created a new opening for
students, sparking a new cycle of contention.
Unlike Bachelet, who sought to subdue and co-opt the movement through
negotiation, Piñera’s regime was quick to repress. His administration witnessed increased
police violence under the direction of the Minister of the Interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter.
Violence towards students and journalists became the norm in 2011 as militarized police
forces sought to wrest control of the streets from the students. For their part, students became
adept at dodging guanacos and coping with tear gas, which often filled the streets of Santiago
and other cities. While this violence was largely targeted at students, bystanders were often
caught in the crossfire. Piñera’s administration also sought to decrease the movement’s
visibility by restricting the routes of marches, though students found ways to counter these
measures. But students were not the only ones opposed to Piñera’s rule. From February
through August 2011, his approval ratings plummeted from 42% to just 27%, the lowest
levels since the transition to civilian rule.176

Student Leaders to Global Superstars
Similar to the Penguin Revolution, the leaders of the Chilean Winter played central
roles in the mobilizations, though the latter garnered far more national and international
media attention than their predecessors. The most famous leader was Vallejo, President of
the FECh and a member of the Communist Party. Second in command was Francisco
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Figueroa. Georgio Jackson, president of the FEUC and member of the Nueva Acción
Universitaria (NAU) also was a key protagonist. These leaders became celebrities within
Chile and also gained international prominence, riding on the wave of momentum from
international social movements in 2011, such as Spain’s Indignados, Occupy movements
throughout the United States, and the Arab Spring. In October, Vallejo, Figueroa, and
Jackson completed a six-day tour through Europe, where they received a hero’s welcome
from their peers. In the age of mass and social media, they became the faces of the Chilean
Winter.
Vallejo in particular became the symbol of movement and the center of media
attention. A poll in the Guardian named her “Person of the Year” and a journalist described
her as “an eloquent and attractive young woman who exudes self-confidence and style.”177
The New York Times crowned her the “World’s Most Glamorous Revolutionary,” describing
her as a “Botticelli beauty who wears a silver nose ring.”178 Many Chilean media outlets also
sexualized Vallejo, often dedicating more print to her appearance than her politics. While it
was Vallejo’s politics and leadership, not her looks, that won her support within the
movement, it is important to emphasize the differential media coverage she received
compared to her male counterparts.
Although none of the leaders of the Penguin Revolution assumed protagonist roles in
2011, many of the leaders first became radicalized under the 2006 mobilizations. Most
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university students in 2011 were in high school during the Penguin Revolution; even if they
had not participated actively in protests, they had at least come of age within that political
climate.
Secondary students were also active in the 2011 movement, though they took a
backseat to their elders. The Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios (CONES)
and ACES were active organizers of marches, and hundreds of high schools went on strike
and occupied their schools for many months. However, these secondary students and
organizations found themselves marginalized from the movement’s leadership and often
excluded from negotiations with the government.

Demands
What began as calls for the timely dispersal of stipends grew to three larger demands
by the middle of the year: university financing reform; an end to for-profit education; and
universal access to high-quality education. Over the course of the Chilean Winter, students
began to zero in on their central demand and rallying cry of the movement: educación
gratuita, or free public education. Unlike arancel diferenciado, educación gratuita
demanded that the state restructure its higher education system rather than merely provide
scholarships to the lower classes. This demand transcended the narrow focus of the Penguin
Revolution. In doing so, students challenged the logic of the privatization of education, one
of the pillars of Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms.
According to Méndez, the movement was slow to incorporate calls for free education
“porque creíamos que no había fuerza o creíamos que no había la convicción necesaria para
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exigir una educación gratuita.” As the movement swelled, leaders grew more confident:
“[L]uego la movilización fue muy grande, y ganó la tesis de la educación gratuita.”179 To
finance this costly reform, students proposed tax increases, decreased military spending, and
the renationalization of the copper industry. It was not a question of whether or not free
public education was possible, they contended. The state was financially capable of granting
this demand, but they had chosen not to do so. Similar to the Penguin Revolution, which
expanded its demands to broader structural critiques with increased momentum, the Chilean
Winter also relied upon growing support to push for a more ambitious agenda.

Chronology of the Movement
While some scholarship puts May as the onset of the 2011 movement, it is necessary
to look back a few more months.180 At the end of March, students and academics at the
Universidad Central, a private university in Santiago, protested the sale of the university to a
for-profit company with ties to Concertación politicians. The attempted sale of La Central,
they argued, represented the “colusión institucionalizada entre mercaderes y politicos,” as
well as the marketization of education, or the granting of control of education to market
forces.181 On April 4, students and faculty declared an indefinite strike. Later that week, 800
students marched towards the Ministry of Education. While this march received scant media
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coverage, “despertó la atención de los estudiantes de otras casas de estudio,”182 bringing the
issue of for-profit education to students’ and public attention.
Mobilizations at the Universidad Central also represented a significant departure from
the typical middle class movement as these protests were led by lower-income, firstgeneration private school students. Figueroa describes the impact that this changing
demographic had on the movement:
No era la Resistencia de los hijos de la vieja clase media a la pérdida de beneficios ni
tampoco la rabia existencial de grupúsculos sobreideologizados. Se trataba de
estudiantes de títulos atados a las tasas de interés de créditos usureros, cuyo sueño de
ser la primera generación de su familia en ingresar a la universidad pendía de la
codicia, gestionada por el Estado, de bancos y casas comerciales.183
For less well-off students, private universities that accepted lower PSU scores were often
their only option. To attend these universities, however, they had to take out loans and incur
significant debt. For-profit institutions and their adverse impact on students of lesser means
thus became a central focus of the movement.
The Confech hesitated, however, to welcome private students to the federation for
two reasons. First, traditional university students often looked down upon private students,
reflecting a classist elitism. Additionally, many students feared that accepting these
universities would legitimate Chile’s for-profit schools. For Figueroa and students from the
Izquierda Autónoma, however, the incorporation of private university students into the
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movement “[s]ignificaba ampliar la alianza social y golpear un nicho de negocios sostenidos
con subvenciones del Estado.”184 Private school participation thus expanded both the
movement’s composition and targets.
Mobilizations reached the Universidad de Chile following the delayed dispersal of
scholarships and stipends from the Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas (JUNAEB). In
response, students decided to occupy JUNAEB offices on April 14 to “denunciar la raíz del
asunto: el encarecimiento y la precarización de la educación producto de su
mercantilización.”185 They were joined by similar occupations in other cities, prompting the
resignation of María Teresa Ross, the JUNAEB’s director.
Following this modest victory, the Confech declared national mobilizations on April
28 and May 12. As Méndez explained:
[H]icimos una marcha nacional luego de esta manifestación pequeña el 28 de abril y
ahí fue donde nosotros como equipo de comunicaciones dijimos ya, aquí era todos los
estudiantes porque es un tema de las becas, que no es tan político, pero si puede ser
accesible.186
Leaders realized that even though this was a relatively apolitical issue, it would still garner
mass support. Despite an increasingly tense political climate, the April 28 demonstration saw
low turnout, with estimates of seven to nine thousand students in the streets of Santiago.187
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The May 12 march was notably stronger, drawing 50,000, according to El Mercurio
and Vallejo (though Figueroa estimated a much smaller figure, 15,000). This number also
included members of the Colegio de Profesores, Agrupación Nacional de Empleados
Fiscales, and the CUT. As expected, El Mercurio was quick to highlight isolated incidents of
violence, noting that there were 53 arrests in Santiago and 85 in other regions throughout the
country. Below the paper’s headline, a quote from Minister of Education Joaquín Lavín read:
“‘Los más desprotegidos y que tienen menos becas no estaban en la calle.’” 188 According to
Lavín, it was not the most disadvantaged students from professional and technical institutions
who led this march. Rather, the FECh and other universities belonging to the Consejo de
Rectores189 took charge.
Although this protest was still relatively small, especially in comparison with future
demonstrations, it was successful because it was “la primera en poner una agenda estudiantil
sobre la mesa y en interpelar a La Moneda para que diera una respuesta.”190 By this point,
students decided to pursue three objectives: equal access to education, which included the
abolition of the PSU; increased financing based on family income; and democratization.191
Even as the movement solidified its demands following this march, it still lacked a broader
vision. Their demands, for instance, did not yet include free education, but rather
scholarships for the lowest three quintiles and an arancel diferenciado for the upper two.192
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Spurred by demands for institutional improvement, numerous schools began tomas
following the May 12 protest. These tomas and the preceding marches sought to pressure
Piñera to address students’ grievances during his annual speech on May 21, much as students
had mobilized in advance of Bachelet’s 2006 address. Students also marched in Valparaíso
on the day of his speech, as had become customary. Following Piñera’s address, students
realized “que en realidad no había nada para el movimiento estudiantil. No había ni siquiera
un peso más destinado a los recursos de la educación en Chile.”193 Frustrated by the
President’s failure to acknowledge their demands, several thousand students marched in
Santiago and Valparaíso on May 26. Students delivered a letter to Piñera, expressing their
disapproval and declaring an ultimatum that a failure to address their demands would trigger
an indefinite national strike beginning on June 1.
Piñera countered with his own letter, indicating his willingness to engage in dialogue
and also stressing that students at private universities and centros de formación técnica
“deben sentarse a conversar con nosotros.”194 By this point, students had expanded their
demands to reflect a more coherent ideological vision: “[E]l aumento del financiamiento
público a las instituciones públicas y del CRUCH, quebrando así la lógica de concentrar los
recursos en el subsidio a la demanda; el fin del endeudamiento de las familias, y la
prohibición efectiva del lucro.”195 While the demands were still focused exclusively on issues
affecting the university, for the first time, they reflected a greater critique of the underlying
neoliberal logic and the ways that for-profit education affected families.
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In an attempt to undercut the planned June 1 demonstrations, the government
convened a meeting with the Confech. Figueroa describes the government’s reasoning behind
their offer:
Lavín buscaba sacarse de encima el estigma de autoridad inflexible y dejar la pelota
de nuestro lado, pensando que si accedíamos comenzaría la canalización institucional
del conflicto y el retroceso de las movilizaciones, y que si rechazábamos su invitación
quedaríamos ante la opinión pública como intransigentes interesados únicamente en
complicarle la marcha al Gobierno.
In this way, the administration sought to enhance its public image and show students to be
inflexible and unwilling to engage in negotiation. Students, however, accepted this invitation,
although they dismissed it as simply “una reunión para los medios,”196 or a publicity stunt.
Throughout June, hundreds of universities and high schools mounted tomas. On June
9, students at the Universidad de Chile spontaneously occupied the Casa Central. That night,
close to 500 students slept there. By early June, students occupied 26 schools. This number
would grow to nearly 140 schools in Santiago alone by the end of July.197 During the Chilean
Winter, hundreds of school occupations across the country generated momentum and
successfully applied pressure on the Piñera administration. Tomas served as important spaces
for collective identity formation and education. At night, students set up camp in classrooms
and hallways. During the day, they rolled up their sleeping bags and held meetings, prepared
for marches, and held cultural activities.
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Luis “Lucho” Gallardo Cochifas, a student at PUCV, recounted his experience living
in the toma of the university’s Casa Central for several months. Serving on the kitchen crew,
Gallardo spoke to the mostly disciplined nature of the toma, efforts to preserve cleanliness,
and vigilance against possible infiltration. But he also addressed internal tensions and the
difficulty of maintaining the occupation over the course of several months. Towards the end
of the takeover, exhaustion and police repression dealt a blow to the occupation: “Al final de
la toma, ya empezó a disminuir…. Disminuyó harto. Había cansancio, un poco de
desesperanza, frustración, nos había chocado un poco igual la realidad. En un momento
Hinzpeter…fue malo. El de verdad nos recordaba mucho una figura dictatorial.”
Six years later, Gallardo waxed nostalgic about his experience. “En toda la
universidad es el momento en que más he aprendido cosas, el momento que ha sido más
motivador, lo más transcendente.” He also reflected upon the collective identity forged
within the toma: “compartimos todo. El sueño, el hambre, el frío, la comida, el miedo de los
pacos [pólice], la rabia por los pacos.”198 Careful not to over-romanticize his experience,
though, Gallardo’s memories from the toma encapsulate both the excitement and power of
the toma, as well as the difficulties of maintaining a sustained occupation over the course of
the Chilean Winter.
One of the largest marches occurred on June 16, with an estimated 80,000 protestors
in Santiago and another 80,000 throughout the rest of the country. While some sources claim
that this had been the largest march since the return of democracy, other mobilizations during
the Penguin Revolution witnessed similar turnouts. Reflecting on the march, however,
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Figueroa notes that it lacked political unity, with public and private students, secondary
school students, professors, and other educators all articulating different demands.
Lavín responded to this march with another letter that included slightly modified
proposals. These, he hoped, would “sirven de base para la creación de una mesa de trabajo
que permita normalizar las actividades académicas y que en un plazo de 90 días contribuya a
enfrentar los temas planteados y a buscar consensos respecto a aquellas materias que deberá
decidir el Congreso Nacional.”199 This letter was intended to placate the public by
demonstrating the great efforts the government was willing to go to reach an accord. Not
surprisingly, a wary Confech rejected this offer, announcing a national strike for June 30.
Hoping to break the movement in anticipation of the scheduled strike, Lavín declared
an early start to winter vacation on June 28. While he declared that his motivation was to
“save” the school year, this was quite clearly a strategic, if cynical, maneuver to undermine
strikes and demobilize the movement. Lavín’s announcement had little impact, as the
majority of schools continued in paros or toma.
By this point, Lavín had begun meeting with the Consejo de Rectores in a clear
attempt to skirt negotiations with students and co-opt the movement. The day after Lavín’s
decision to begin vacation early, the Consejo de Rectores rejected the government’s latest set
of proposals, setting off the June 30 mobilization. Estimates for the march’s turnout vary by
source: La Tercera reported over 80,000 students in Santiago, while Figueroa optimistically
declared 200,000 in Santiago and another 180,000 in other cities. Furthermore, while
Figueroa contends that the protest gathered a diverse crowd, Lavín countered that it was
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largely composed of the usual university students, and not private school students most
affected by the crisis. As Lavín stated: “‘[C]reo que los dirigentes se politizaron, pero la
ciudadanía no. Desde que se produjo este giro, dejé de hablarles a grupos específicos y
empecé a dirigirme a la opinión pública con más claridad.’”200 Denouncing the protest as
unrepresentative of the greater public, Lavín sought to delegitimize the movement.
Although Lavín did not outwardly condemn the demonstrations, he dismissed the
utility of the marches and insisted on the need for dialogue.
Las puertas de este ministerio seguirán abiertas, pero no voy a caer en la ingenuidad
de abrirme a estudiar un tema cuando al día siguiente los estudiantes lo desechan y
vuelven con una nueva artillería de exigencias que están totalmente fuera de mi
alcance. Siempre he estado dispuesto a conversar los temas que realmente están
relacionados con la educación. Lo que no se puede hacer es mezclar las legítimas
demandas con exigencias políticas e ideológicas.201
This approach mirrored Bachelet’s response five years earlier. Such statements painted
students as irrational and limited acceptable negotiations to the confines of the Ministry.
The government announced another proposal on July 5, this time coming in a televised
address from Piñera himself. Among the concessions of the Gran Acuerdo Nacional por la
Educación (GANE) were the creation of the Fondo para Educación, increased scholarships
for technical and professional universities, increased scholarships for the two lowest
quintiles, and a decreased interest rate for the CAE. While Piñera presented this as a “great”

Figueroa, 113; “Joaquín Lavín: ‘Los que marcharon no representan a todos los estudiantes,’” La Tercera,
July 1, 2011, http://diario.latercera.com/edicionimpresa/joaquin-lavin-los-que-marcharon-no-representan-atodos-los-estudiantes/.
201
“Joaquín Lavín.”
200

93

new proposal, Figueroa notes, “[n]o había nada que Lavín no hubiese prometido antes. Lo
que el Gobierno pretendía era revertir el alto rechazo social que venía recibiendo su gestión y
la presión política en que eso se traducía, corrigiendo la idea de que no estaba haciendo nada
por solucionar el conflicto y mejorar la educación.”202 Furthermore, Piñera’s proposal did not
agree to put an end to profiteering, By reintroducing past proposals, the government sought
to placate the movement and paint itself as conciliatory to turn public opinion against
students.
In the introduction to his speech, Piñera proclaimed: “Ya es tiempo terminar con las
tomas y las protestas y recuperar los caminos del diálogo y los acuerdos.”203 In this way,
Piñera pitted students and families against each other, demonizing those who chose to
mobilize as indifferent to their classmates’ education. This statement also echoed Lavín’s
earlier statements that created a binary between protest and negotiation, signaling
deliberations as the only appropriate option. Later in his speech, Piñera defended private
education and the right to school choice, reaffirming his commitment to “protegiendo el
derecho de ellos y sus familias a elegir libremente la institución en que quieren estudiar.”204
For Piñera and the political class, education was a consumer good, not a right.
In an attempt to reach an agreement with the Consejo de Rectores, who by this point
served as intermediaries with Piñera’s administration, the Confech put forth a proposal on
July 12, the Acuerdo Social por la Educación. According to Vallejo, the central tenets of this
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hoped-for agreement, in line with the movement’s demands, were: “[P]oner fin al lucro en
todo el sistema educacional, la desmunicipalización sin privatización y, además, avanzar
hacia un sistema nacional de educación pública de calidad y gratuito.” As Nataly Espinoza,
president of the student federation of the PUCV, expressed, the Consejo de Rectores
attempted to co-opt the movement in order to reach an agreement with the government. “Hay
que recordar que este movimiento lo ha levantado la comunidad universitaria, los estudiantes
en las calles, los profesores, los trabajadores, donde, en definitiva, los rectores están tratando
de utilizarnos como un bono de término de conflicto con el gobierno y eso nos parece
erróneo.” 205
As they awaited a response, students began an unauthorized march on July 14 from
Plaza Italia, the traditional starting point of marches. Students estimated 100,000 people in
attendance, but El Mercurio offered a much smaller crowd size of 30,000. Isolated violence
caused by encapuchados ended in 62 arrests and 10 serious police injuries. As usual, El
Mercurio’s coverage emphasized the violence and damages, rather than the students’ tactics
or demands.206
Following this march and in response to steadily decreasing approval ratings,207
Piñera shuffled around his cabinet, replacing Lavín with Felipe Bulnes. Additionally, Piñera
replaced his Minister of Mining and Energy, likely in response to protests led by
environmental and indigenous activists in the south.208 These changes were a major victory
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for the students: after three months of mobilization, they successfully had ousted two key
cabinet members.

Tactics
The Chilean Winter distinguished itself from earlier mobilizations through its
innovative tactics which caught the public eye and brought attention to the movement’s
demands. Interspersed with marches, paros, and tomas were a mélange of flash mobs, street
theater, and other forms of public intervention that “rompían con el esquema de un día
normal en la ciduad,”209 according to one student. These actions changed the mood of the
protests, captured media and public attention, and leveled criticisms against the neoliberal
order through the creative use of urban space and bodies.
For example, on June 13, theater students at the Universidad de Chile began running
laps around La Moneda, the presidential palace (See Figure 3:5). These students relayed for
1,800 hours, or 75 days, without stopping, symbolizing the 1,800 million pesos that the state
would need to finance free public education. According to one of the organizers, “estamos
conscientes de que la plata para financiar la educación pública está, pero lo que no hay es
voluntad por parte de los políticos. Esa misma voluntad es la que nos hace estar acá día y
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Figure 3:5
Students running around La Moneda as part of “1800 horas
por la educación.” This action lasted from June 13-August 26, 2011.
http://www.lacuarta.com/noticia/terminaron-las-1800-horas-por-la-educacion/.

noche y que queremos despertar en la clase política.”210 Not only did this action require
immense physical dedication, but it also necessitated round-the-clock logistical support. A
video of the action shows students running around La Moneda day and night. Laps were
meticulously logged in a record book, and organizers waited on the sidewalk with
sandwiches, Gatorade, and banana smoothies for runners.211 Combining an innovative stunt
that literally circled the president’s palace with the symbolism of 1,800 hours, the action
simultaneously disrupted public space and engaged with the public while presenting a
pointed political critique.
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Following a similar line of logic, YouTube videos from Antofagasta show students
engaging in an 1,800 second besatón, or kiss-in, on July 6. Couples kissed with signs reading
“con pasión por la educación” (“with passion for education”) or “¡Enamorada pero
seriamente endeudada!” (“in love but seriously indebted!”), while a recording of Titanic’s
“My Heart Will Go On” played in the background.212 Santiago also witnessed a besatón that
same evening.
Perhaps one of the most popular street demonstrations was a massive “Thriller”
flashmob in front of La Moneda on June 24 (See Figure 3:6). Several hundred medical
students dressed as zombies to represent the dying state of Chilean education.213 The zombies
represented the reawakening of the victims of neoliberalism, rising out of their tombs to

Figure 3:6
“Thriller” flash mob held in front of La Moneda on June 25, 2011.
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challenge the established order. As del Campo argues, “[i]nvading the neoliberal city and the
world of the living, the medical student zombies threatened to sully the aseptic veneer of the
Chilean miracle.”214
Another flash mob held in the Plaza de Armas on July 18 featured students dressed as
superheroes fighting for public education. A booming voice interrupted acrobatic stunts and
stage combat, announcing: “Tienen algo mucho más importante por que luchar. Su educación
pública, el pilar de la sociedad está siendo cruelmente debilitada y está al punto de
desaparecer.”215 In response to this rallying cry, students erupted in a choreographed flash
mob. Putting aside individual disputes between superheroes and villains, the troupe came
together to collectively fight for their public education.
A final example of innovative street theatre was “Una playa para Lavín,” held in the
Plaza de Armas on July 5 (See Figure 3:7). Hundreds of people stripped down to their
bathing suits in the middle of the Chilean winter, pulling out towels, umbrellas, and other
beach paraphernalia. Held the week after Lavín declared an early start to vacation, this
undermined his efforts to combat student strikes. Additionally, the scene expressly mocked
an urban beach that Lavín had created for underprivileged children during his tenure as
mayor of Santiago.216
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Figure 3:7
“Playa para Lavín,” a winter beach scene held on July 5, 2011,
in protest of Lavín’s decision to begin winter vacation early.
http://terremoto.mx/article/street-performativities-student-movementspolitical-action-and-the-culture-industry/.
Beyond attracting media attention and involving the popular sector, these public
interventions also challenged notions of urban space within the neoliberal city. These
demonstrations, del Campo argues, “reappropriated the neoliberal city—segregated,
atomized, and consumption-driven— and transformed it momentarily into a counterneoliberal/counterhegemonic space, where a community of collective participation, marked
by solidarity and the promotion of social change, emerged.”217 Occupying public space,
students reappropriated city streets and promoted a collective identity. This logic even
extended to besatones, as students engaged publicly in acts normally relegated to the private
sphere: “Everyone who participated seemed to use his or her body, and the body of another,
to perform in public—and collectively—an affective practice that is usually relegated to the
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private and personal sphere; it was a way to defy the excessive privatization of shared
experience.”218 This critique of the neoliberal city went hand-in-hand with students’ attacks
on the neoliberalization of education.

“Pacos, guanacos y lumas”219 and State Repression
On August 3, Confech representatives, secondary students, and members of the
Colegio de Profesores met with Hinzpeter, who had denied requests for a march permit along
the Alameda. Despite Hinzpeter’s refusal, students decided to march there the following day.
In anticipation of the march, the police placed more troops along the route, which students
had barricaded that morning. High school students marched in the morning while university
students took to the streets in the afternoon, revealing a lack of coordination, according to
Figueroa. This was reflective of growing tensions between university and secondary students.
A former spokeswoman for ACES later echoed this sentiment, admitting that the Confech
“era súper conflictiva, fría y distante con los secundarios, sobre todo con la ACES.”220 The
Confech also had excluded secondary leaders from the mesas de diálogo with the
government, even as secondary students actively participated in the mobilizations.
Shortly after the morning march began, tear gas filled the air. The streets remained
saturated with gas by the time university students started marching in the afternoon.
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Unauthorized protests broke out throughout Chile, many of them ending in violence and
police repression.221 As students and police fought for control of the streets throughout the
day, violence erupted on both sides. Later that evening, encapuchados sacked and burned La
Polar, the store that had ignited protests earlier that year. This was not merely an act of
senseless vandalism, however; by burning La Polar, encapuchados hoped to redirect public
attention to the company’s predatory actions.
As Ibarra explained in an interview, the day’s events galvanized popular support for the
movement. Excessive police repression generated:
[S]olidaridad con el movimiento estudiantil porque la gente entendió de que los
jóvenes estaban decididos, que no era un juego de niños…. Entonces la gente empezó
a apoyar al movimiento estudiantil y también empezó a tener temor de que se viniera
una nueva militarización…un golpe militar o una guerra civil porque el nivel de
represión le recordó de eso.222
She emphasized that while student leaders expected repression, it was much greater than
anticipated. The use of excessive force invoked fear as it reminded older generations of the
violence many had experienced under the dictatorship.
At 9 o’clock that night, cacerolazos rang out in Santiago and other cities as the
popular classes banged pots and pans in support of the students. “La gente común y corriente
sale a la calle a brindar su apoyo al movimiento estudiantil mediante golpes en ollas vacías,
en sartenes, en cucharas de palo,”223 recounts an RBP article. Cacerolazos, as argued in
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Chapter 1, had been significant spatial interventions that represented the mobilization of the
middle class women under Allende and later popular class mobilization in opposition to
Pinochet’s dictatorship. These cacerolazos were the first ones since the return to democracy,
which del Campo argues “clearly associated Piñera’s administration with the dictatorship.”224
The following morning, the front page of La Tercera, a newspaper with a slightly less
overt conservative slant than El Mercruio, highlighted the violence of the marches with a
large picture of a street ablaze with the caption “Protestas tras prohibición de marcha causan
violentos disturbios en Santiago.” Below this headline, however, was another story that
announced that Piñera’s public approval ratings had plummeted to 26%, the lowest rating
since 1989. As Paty explained, “la prensa solidarizó con el movimiento estudiantil, que creo
que era lo único dio que lo hizo, ¿cachai? Y empezó una mostrada de los niveles de
violencia…fue como un vuelto que yo creo que la prensa estuvo obligada a hacer.”225 If the
mainstream media still emphasized the movement’s violence, it was at least beginning to
document widespread public disapproval for the administration’s tactics. Thus, increased
repression in tandem with growing public support for the students contributed to making the
August 4 demonstrations a watershed for the movement.
The Climax and Fall of the Chilean Winter
The second half of August saw two of the most significant marches of the Chilean
Winter. The March of the Umbrellas, held on a rainy winter day on August 18, was less
violent and repressive than previous ones, in part because students and authorities
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compromised on the march’s route. While this march had a smaller turnout, with estimates of
around 50,000, it set the stage for the largest demonstration yet.
On August 21, hundreds of thousands joined in the Marcha familiar por la educación,
a march and free festival in Parque O’Higgins. (Officials estimated 100,000 attendees, while
students contended that the crowds were closer to a million.) What set this march apart was
its composition; as its name suggests, this demonstration attracted families and people of all
ages in a peaceful, carnivalesque day of action. Photos of the protest show grandparents
marching with large banners and children holding signs atop parents’ shoulders (Figure
3:9).226 Figueroa explains that “El objetivo era ofrecer una instancia de expresión a esas

Figure 3:8
“Marcha familiar por la educación,” held on August 21.
http://archivo.elcomercio.pe/mundo/actualidad/fotos-marcha-familiareducacion-congrega-cientos-miles-personas-chile-noticia-1111255.
“Miles de personas se congregan en Parque O’Higgins por marcha familiar por la educación,” Emol, August
21, 2011, http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/08/21/499013/miles-de-personas-se-congregan-enparque-ohiggins-por-marcha-familiar-por-la-educacion.html.
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miles de personas que desde sus casas y lugares de trabajo apoyaban pero no podían o no
querían asistir a las marchas. Además queríamos desmarcarnos de los hechos de violencia
que venían copando la discusión desde julio.”227 The familial composition of this protest
capitalized on the movement’s favorable public approval and countered the mainstream
media’s usually critical depiction of mobilizations.
Demonstrations organized in conjunction with the labor union also demonstrated
popular class support for the movement. A two-day strike led by the CUT on August 24 and
25 epitomized this solidarity.228 Workers were clearly inspired by the students. Roberto
Morales, a union leader, expressed: “Tenemos que seguir el ejemplo de los estudiantes.
Nuestros hijos nos han enseñado que la lucha se consigue en la calle.”229 While the strike
appeared to exemplify a harmonious relationship between the student and labor movements,
Figueroa argues that there was tension surrounding this strike:
[V]eíamos este paro más como un peligro que como una oportunidad. Las cooptadas
cúpulas sindicales de la CUT contaminarían la causa estudiantil con su desprestigio,
además de abrir la puerta para que los intereses de la Concertación se aferraran—tras
su estrepitoso fracaso en la trinchera estudiantil—a puestos de comando e
intermediación de la movilización con el Estado.230
Students worried that the CUT’s presence in the movement would make it easier for
authorities to co-opt the movement. Furthermore, the strike’s tone and tactics differed
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markedly from the students’ protest: “[T]he strike had a bureaucratic character, lacking the
creativity and audacity of the students, which shows some of the CUT’s limits in supporting
the student struggle up to this point.”231 Though the strike suggested intergenerational
solidarity, especially as many of the striking workers were protesting alongside their
children, it is important not to overstate the significance of this collaboration.
On August 25, the mood of the protest changed again and an extreme display of state
violence garnered even greater support for the students. Police forces shot and killed Manuel
Gutiérrez, a sixteen-year old innocently observing a cacerolazo. His death ignited further
indignation towards the regime and attracted international criticism. While five police
officers were dismissed following his death, neither police nor the Ministry of the Interior
assumed full responsibility, claiming that it was an accidental and isolated incident.232
On September 3, Confech representatives met with Piñera for another round of
negotiations. However, a plane crash on the previous night that killed Felipe Camiroaga,
Chile’s most popular news anchor, put a damper on media coverage and public support for
the talks. Following this news, student leaders debated whether or not attend the negotiations,
fearing that Piñera might not be in attendance.233 While Piñera was at the meeting, the
administration ignored most of the students’ proposals, refusing to budge on for-profit
education and increased funding for public education. As Figueroa argues, participation in
this negotiation may have bolstered public opinion, on the one hand, since it demonstrated
students’ willingness to engage in dialogue, but it also served to co-opt the movement.
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Following this round of talks, the tone of the movement began to change. Marches
throughout September saw much smaller turnout, mobilizing fewer than 20,000 people. The
media was quick to capitalize on the small attendance, internal divisions within the
movement, and general exhaustion within the Confech, suggesting that the movement was
split between the moderados and ultras.234 To the government and media´s surprise,
however, students convened a massive mobilization on September 22, with organizers
estimating around 150,000 in attendance in Santiago and 40,000 in other regions. An
impassioned Vallejo optimistically declared: “Esta lucha va a seguir…. Nuestras demandas
han llegado para quedarse. Hoy día el pueblo chileno despertó, está mirando hacia el futuro y
quiere ser parte de ese futuro.”235 Giorgio Jackson echoed this sentiment, stating that the
movement “‘que estaba supuestamente decaído, en realidad no lo estaba.’”236 Student leaders
viewed this victory as a repudiation of media claims of a moribund movement.
This momentum proved short-lived, however. Throughout September and October,
high schools and universities ended their paros and tomas, some voluntarily and others by
force. As the academic year came to an end, the movement steadily lost steam. On October 3,
Hinzpeter proposed the Ley Hinzpeter, which criminalized school occupations.237
Furthermore, las mesas de diálogo between the government and student leaders began to
fracture.238
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Student leaders acknowledged that by the end of the year, the movement’s novelty
and the impact of nontraditional tactics had begun to wear off. Indefinite paros and tomas
were no longer viable options for the mobilizations ahead. As Vallejo explained:
El paro indefinido, en su momento, fue necesario para todas las discusiones y
actividades, y como presión a las autoridades…. El próximo año no se puede repetir.
No podemos estar con seis o siete meses de paro todos los años. No podemos perder
las clases, porque nos perjudica y perjudicamos también al país, no entregándole
profesionales con buena formación. Sabemos que nuestras demandas son de largo
plazo. En ese sentido, aspiramos a utilizar otra estrategia de movilización. Que
podemos estar en clases y no perjudicar nuestra formación profesional, pero que
también tengamos espacios institucionalizados de debate y de elaboración de
propuestas.239
On December 18, students ended the toma at the Casa Central. By this point,
however, only some of the most radical students remained in the building. While the return to
classes and summer vacation effectively ended the mobilizations, the movement would
reemerge in the near future, though the demonstrations were never of the same magnitude.
In December, Vallejo lost the FECh presidency by 189 votes to Gabriel Boric,
indicating an important shift for the FECh and the student movement at large. Representing
the Izqueirda Autónoma, Boric had promised to distance the movement from traditional
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political parties, unlike Vallejo, whose membership in the Communist Party aligned the
movement with partisan politics.
In an interview shortly after his election, Boric reflected upon some of the
shortcomings of the past year’s mobilization and the future direction of the movement:
La principal crítica que hacemos, porque también fuimos parte de él, fue el no haber
fortalecido las alianzas con otros sectores sociales. Se debilitó la alianza con los
secundarios. En este sentido, nuestro énfasis el próximo año será fortalecer los lazos y
la organización, en conjunto con trabajadores, pobladores, secundarios y compañeros
de las universidades privadas, y a todos los que quieran transformar este país.240
According to Boric, the movement’s shortcoming was its inability to connect more broadly
with other sectors of civil society. He emphasized the need to continue expanding the
movement’s base, arguing that the fight was not only for quality education, but rather the
recomposition of democracy: “Tenemos que ampliarnos también hacia los pobladores, los
medioambientalistas o los consumidores, porque entendemos que la pelea que estamos dando
no tiene que ver sólo con la calidad de la educación, sino con la calidad de la democracia que
tenemos.’”241
If the Chilean Winter failed to solidify these linkages, the movement would seek to
build more sustained ties with civil society in the ensuing years. Although students could not
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maintain the momentum and mass appeal that they achieved in 2011, the years to come
would see a significant broadening of the movement.

From the Streets to the Seats of Congress
Since the 2011 mobilizations, students expanded their efforts to win public office, an
indicator of growing recognition for the movement’s most emblematic leaders. In 2013, four
former leaders won municipal elections: Vallejo, Boric, Jackson, and Karol Cariola, a
Communist Party leader who in 2010 had served as the president of Federación de
Estudiantes de la Universidad de Concepción. While Vallejo and Cariola belong to the Nueva
Mayoría (the center-left coalition led by Bachelet), Boric and Jackson ran as independents.
Boric’s victory is of particular importance since the Izquierda Autónoma (IA), the universitybased political group that he represents, had consistently eschewed participation in partisan
politics.242 Even as the IA ran members in congressional elections, it maintained its
opposition to the Nueva Mayoría, unlike Vallejo and the Communist Party, who had
endorsed Bachelet in the 2013 presidential elections.
While these electoral victories may suggest a promising future for the movement and
its demands, students remained critical of these leaders-turned-politicians. Trading in the
more radical, autonomous agenda of the movement for the piecemeal reform of
establishment politics, this new cohort of politicians has come under fire from former peers
for selling out or being co-opted. Vallejo, in particular, received strong criticism for
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endorsing Bachelet and the Nueva Mayoría in the 2013 elections, a reversal of her previously
stated position when she was at the helm of the FECh.
Aracely Moyano, an UPLA student, dismissed these politicans as “opportunists” who
“terminan legislando en favor de su partido en vez de a favor del movimiento estudiantil que
es lo que tanto prometen…. Se les olvida en verdad por lo que están peleando y con el medio
sueldo que tienen, olvidan todo.” Once elected, in her opinion, they lose sight of where they
came from and for what they were fighting. “Al final terminan gobernando para los
empresarios. No se ataca al neoliberalismo… sino siguen gobernando pa’ ellos.”243 As she
attests, leaders end up governing in the interests of businesses and the political elite rather
than the people who helped them get elected.
The participation of radical leaders in establishment politics is not uncommon,
however. Tarrow argues that once social movements are no longer disruptive and exciting,
they “institutionalize their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for their supporters
through negotiation and compromise—a route that often succeeds at the cost of transforming
the movement into a party or interest group.”244 Determining whether these appointments
advance or stymie the movement is beyond the temporal scope of this project.
If some of these leaders-turned-politicians represented the co-optation of the
movement, their ascension to Congress also testifies to the public support and recognition for
the movement and its goals. But the multiple perspectives surrounding the institutionalization
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of the most exemplary leaders is important, however, in assessing the results of the Chilean
Winter and contextualizing it within social movement theory.

Conclusion
Like the 2006 movement, the Chilean Winter fell short of its key demands. It did,
however, win minor concessions, such as lower loan interest rates. Additionally, the
resignation of Lavín and the replacement of Bulnes at the end of the year must be considered
tangible victories for the movement. More importantly, however, it brought the fight for free,
quality education and the end to for-profit universities to the public’s attention. As declining
approval ratings for Piñera demonstrated, students’ mobilizations successfully influenced
public opinion.
The election of former leaders to Congress reflects the tremendous success of the
movement. But as students have critiqued, this also represents the movement’s
institutionalization. This was a logical step, however, as the movement began splintering into
more radical and moderate factions. Tensions between radicalization and institutionalization
would reemerge in the ensuing years, reflecting the diversity that at times strengthened and at
other points demobilized the movement.
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Conclusion
After more than a decade of mobilizations, it may appear that the student movement
has little to show for it. While students have won minor concessions from the state, they are
quick to note that these are incomplete victories. For example, while Bachelet granted free
education to the lower quintiles, this did not, as students had called for, transform the
educational system; education in Chile is still treated as a commodity rather than a universal
right. Furthermore, what minor victories the movement has achieved in recent years are
likely to be chipped away at during Piñera’s presidency.
For students at the heart of the movement, it can be difficult for them to step back and
gauge success. Mired in the internal workings of the mobilizations, some may fail to see the
relative progress of the movement. Furthermore, the common sense understanding of
“success” narrowly defined as policy reform fails to consider other forms of political change
brought about by social movements. This perpetuates a zero sum binary between success and
failure that leaves little room for alternative visions of change. As voices from within the
movement have shown, this self-critical perception can often demobilize a movement; if
students do not see tangible victories, they are likely to become exhausted and no longer
committed to the cause.
I argue that perhaps more important than policy victories is the movement’s ability to
reshape public opinion and shift the political agenda, bringing a major issue like free
education to the forefront of the nation’s attention. In his analysis of social movements
outcomes, Tarrow argues that:
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“Success” for some movements may consist more of establishing a collective identity
than of achieving policy success. It may also consist of placing issues on the political
agenda that would not get there without the movement’s efforts. And it may leave
organizational and cultural residues around which new supporters can mobilize
supporters in the next cycle of contention.245
Per Tarrow’s definition, the student movement has certainly been successful. It has
established a collective, if heterogeneous and often fractured, student identity, placed
education on the political agenda, and left something for the next generation of students to
build on in the form of organizational structures, tactics and demands. And at the very least,
the 2006 and 2011 mobilizations contributed to a longstanding, collective memory of the
importance of activism to bring about social change.
The ephemerality of each cycle of mobilization also makes it difficult to discern
concrete changes or contributions from one generation to the next. Most protest cycles last
only a year. Students graduate, exhaustion sets in as the state simultaneously waits out and/or
represses the movement, and political actors co-opt the movement. This is partially the nature
of social movements, but it is also especially characteristic of student movements. School
vacations interrupt mobilizations, as seen in 2011, and the organization of the movement
constantly evolves, as students graduate and new ones assume leadership roles. It is near
impossible to maintain organizational structures, leadership training, and solidarity networks
in an environment so ephemeral by nature.
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But even if they are short-lived, these cycles of contention leave tangible residues for
the next generation. The Penguin Revolution, which took advantage of negotiation skills
honed in the previous year, in turn trained some of the leaders of the 2011 movement.
Popularizing the toma, paro, and mass march, the 2006 mobilization developed the necessary
repertoire for an even larger movement five years later. Additionally, the Penguin Revolution
set the stage for grander discussions surrounding the precarious state of Chilean education.
The Chilean Winter’s resonance with the popular classes also provided important lessons for
more recent alliances with other social movements. And since the return of democracy,
students have developed a more cogent critique of neoliberalism, drawing from their growing
alliances to present a vision for the future that consciously seeks to look beyond the horizons
of the university
If the student movement is both ephemeral and cyclical, it is also destined to return
given a shifting political climate and the emergence of new student leaders. Current students
not only have the mobilizations of 2011 and 2006 to draw inspiration from, but also a
century-long history of contentious politics: 1983 mobilizations that put Pinochet’s
dictatorship on notice; the university reform of 1968; the overthrow of Ibáñez’s dictatorship
in 1931; and the catalytic moment of discontent in the Teatro Municipal in 1906.
But a myopic, nostalgic view of the past cannot provide the necessary lessons for the
current student movement. It must also take into account the realities of the present and the
challenges of the future. In an increasingly fragmented and socioeconomically stratified
society, public university students must continue to step outside the walls of academe, reach
out to their private university peers, the popular and working classes, and, at strategic
moments, members of the political establishment.
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This thesis also documents how over the past century, students have consistently
acted as the nation’s moral compass, mobilizing around injustice, pressuring the state to act
in the interests of the people, and, at times, experiencing persecution for their efforts. In its
early years, the FECh forged alliances with the working class, establishing literacy and adult
extension courses for laborers and taking to the streets alongside anarcho-syndicalists to
demand rights for workers and to speak out against food scarcity, police repression, foreign
investment, and inequality. The movement has almost always acted in opposition to the
political elite, witnessed by students’ efforts to overthrow the Ibáñez and Pinochet
dictatorships and more recently, their efforts during the Chilean Winter to undermine
Piñera’s legitimacy. But students also at times admonished center-left governments, exposing
the deeply embedded neoliberal policies of the Concertación years and pushing for reform
during Bachelet’s presidency. And even those students who supported Allende’s democratic
socialist revolution agitated for greater change.
In response from pressure to below, state actors over the past century have responded
with a mix of concessions and brutal repression and concessions. Dictatorship and
democracy alike have used state violence to suppress discontent. And as mobilizations under
Bachelet and Piñera have shown, the state has actively attempted to delegitimize and co-opt
the movement and its demands. Students have just cause to be skeptical of the state. But
students’ efforts have not gone unnoticed. Thanks to their persistent call for a more
egalitarian society and because of the price they have paid for standing up for their beliefs,
students have earned the admiration of many Chileans, which has in turn strengthened the
movement.
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The Chilean student movement is a prescient example for understanding other social
movements across the globe. As the political pendulum swings to the right from the United
States to Europe and back to Chile once again, innovative social movements and political
coalitions may well prove to be an antidote to deepening privatization, xenophobia, and
political corruption. As Chilean students have shown time and time again, state actors do not
act independently, but rather in response to contentious acts from below. Chile’s vibrant
history of student activism, both in the early twentieth century and in recent decades,
provides both inspiration and cautionary tales.
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Epilogue
“El movimiento de 2011 fue un movimiento derrotado…sus demandas, su intención
de expandir el marco de lo posible política en Chile falló,” a disappointed FECh Executive
Secretary, Diego López Orellano, related to me in 2017. “Nuestras asambleas empezaban a
vaciar, nuestras marchas se transformaron en marchas muy, muy rutinarias, con poca
estrategia política, empezaron a avanzar posiciones que no enfrentaban el conflicto.”246 By
the end of 2011, months of mobilization had left the movement spent. Marches no longer saw
the same numbers, students no longer won over the public and media with their onceinnovative tactics, and the movement appeared to have lost direction and focus.
In 2012, the student movement struggled to regain momentum, mounting regular
demonstrations, but failing to mobilize to the same degree as it had during the previous year.
This period of relative quiescence does not necessarily reflect a failure on the part of the
student movement, but rather is typical of the life cycle of most social movements. Valentina
Núñez Pascual, a student leader at PUCV, explains why the movement lost its novelty:
“Ahora, ¿qué pasa? Nosotros ya pasamos todo ese tiempo, tanto porque había un recambio
generacional.” Núñez attributes the movement’s decline to the ebb and flow of students’
university careers; once student leaders graduate, they no longer have the time to commit to
these causes, and perhaps it is no longer of such importance to them. At the same time, police
learned how to control these demonstrations, and “los medios de comunicación ya estaban
acostumbradas a esas cosas. Empezó una etapa de acostumbramiento. Ya no era
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llamativo.”247 Once-innovative tactics failed to garner the same attention; the media and
general public had become accustomed to the movement’s repertoire.
Tarrow’s writing on the dissipation of social movements corroborates Núñez’s
observation: “Disruption is the source of much of the innovation in the repertoire and of the
power in movement, but it is unstable and easily hardens into violence or becomes routinized
into convention.”248 Novel demonstrations such as flash mobs and kiss-ins quickly became
conventionalized and easily managed by police, who “adapt to these changes with
innovations of their own.”249
Vicente Briones Soto, a student at PUCV, echoed this sentiment while also noting
that such cyclical mobilization was not unusual for a student movement:
Yo creo que en todo caso es normal en cualquier ciclo de movilización estudiantil que
nadie tiene la fuerza para seguir tantos años seguidos…. Yo creo que también más
que el agotamiento físico también hay un agotamiento más psicológico. En cuento a
estar tanto tiempo luchando por algo y ver como no consiguió ningún cambio. Y no
fue solamente el año pasado sino todos los años desde 2006 prácticamente hasta
ahora luchando por una reforma… que termina en nada.
After a decade of mobilizations with modest victories, the student movement faced both
physical and psychological exhaustion. Acknowledging that the movement was not a
complete defeat, Briones continued: “Igual creo que es irresponsable decir ‘nada’ porque hay
avances. No puedo negar que la gratuidad es un avance y otras materias más, pero yo a lo
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menos no lo consideraría una ganada.”250 Quick to acknowledge victories that the movement
had won, he is still critical of the movement’s overall success. While students had won
concessions, the movement was at best a partial victory.
Over the next several years, students would continue fighting for free, quality
education, galvanizing their peers and the popular sectors, though in much smaller numbers.
If the movement post-2011 failed to mobilize the masses in a comparable manner as the
Chilean Winter, protests in the following years did, however, incorporate broader sectors of
society. In particular, the incorporation of feminist demands through the Ni una menos (“Not
One Woman Less”) movement and its recent alignment with No más AFP (Administradoras
de Fondos de Pensiones, usually written as No+ AFP), a movement calling for the end to the
privatized pension system, forged closer links to the popular classes.
These newfound alliances enabled students to connect with broader grievances
against the neoliberal order. “Tratábamos de…vincularlo con un modelo completo que
abarca desde la salud, la educación, la pensión de los ancianos,” explained Briones. “En el
fondo, darnos cuenta que la educación no solo es una lista más de todo lo que implica el
modelo neoliberal y como nosotros como estudiantes desde la educación poder ser la punta
lanza, por decirlo así, o nosotros podemos encabezar un movimiento social mucho más
amplio.”251 While different actors placed distinct demands on the administration, students
realized that they shared a common critique of Pinochet’s neoliberal inheritance.
Efforts to incorporate the popular classes into the movement are evident in posters for
marches from these years. Long a powerful propaganda tool employed by activists, posters
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enabled students to visually represent a collective identity and their demands. One such
example can be seen in a poster for a march on June 26, 2013 (See Figure 4:1). Organized by
the Confech in conjunction with several labor unions, this march called for the
renationalization of the copper industry. State control of these industries, students argued,
would provide the necessary funds to finance free education. Not only did this demand
critique the profiteering transnational control of Chile’s resources, but it also harkened back

Figure 4:1
Poster for a march on June 26, 2013, organized by the
Confech and various labor unions. Image courtesy of
the Archive of the FECh.
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to Allende’s nationalization of the industry. Posters read “recuperar el cobre ¡por la
educación gratuita!” in simple block letters. This demand for free education frames images of
a student holding a megaphone in the background and a miner in a hardhat in the foreground.
Picturing students and workers side by side, this poster visualized the ties between gratuidad
and copper renationalization.252
Marches in 2015 also emphasized the intergenerational, familial nature of the
movement. A poster for a national march on April 16 reads, “Ni corruptos ni empresarios,
que Chile decida su educación” below a cartoon of hands reaching out from suit jackets for a
handshake, while passing a rolled-up wad of cash between them (See Figure 4:2). Beneath
these hands, a mass of people marches through the streets with raised fists, banners, and
flags. Students hold a banner reading “no se vende, se defiende,” a frequent chant heard
while protesting the privatization of education.253 At the head of the march are a girl, who is
likely a secondary student, an elderly woman with a cane, and a boy holding up a pot, a
reference to the frequent cacerolazos. A dog sits at the front of the protestors, a common
sight since stray dogs are fixtures of Chilean urban space. This diverse crew represents
students’ visions of a heterogeneous movement with mass appeal. Juxtaposing politicians and
businessmen with the masses, this poster illustrates civil society’s moralistic impulses
bubbling from below prevailing over corruption and profiteering from above.
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Figure 4:2
Poster for a march on April 16, 2015. Image courtesy of
the Archive of the FECh.
Photos from this march show an elderly couple with sandwich-board signs across their
chests reading “los abuelos apoyamos a nuestros nietos”254 (See Figure 4:3). These
grandparents were later memorialized in posters advertising another march on July 28 (See
Figure 4:4), highlighting the multi-generational, familial character of the march. As seen in
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the 2011 demonstrations, such as the Marcha familiar which drew nearly a million people of
all ages, the student movement began to adopt a more inclusive tone and composition.
Visually incorporating the broader public into its propaganda, the movement provided a
vision that expanded beyond the students and painted the demands of the movement as a
common rallying cry.
The past few years have witnessed examples of students’ solidarity with other social
movements, especially Ni una menos and No+ AFP. The former began in Buenos Aires in
June, 2015, in response to the distressing number of femicides.255 The movement quickly
spread to other parts of Latin America, where machismo and patriarchal violence are equally

Figure 4:3
Figure 4:4
Grandparents at a march on April 16, 2015.
Poster for a march on July 28, 2015,
https://www.telesurtv.net/multimedia/Estudi inspired by the photograph in 4:3. Image
antes-marchan-para-exigir-Que-Chilecourtesy of the Archive of the FECh.
decida-su-educacion-20150416-0040.html.
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present. In Chile, “Ni una menos” has become a call to arms of the feminist movement.
Women and allies of all ages demand political protection in the form of legislation and an
end to gender-based violence.256 Feminists also connect patriarchal violence to capitalism
and state terrorism which, they insist, is embedded within the neoliberal order. Chants such
as “Mujeres contra violencia, mujeres contra el capital, mujeres contra el machismo, contra el
terrorismo neoliberal,” highlight the intersectionality of resistance to such structural forms of
oppression.
These demands are not confined to Ni una menos demonstrations, however. In
student marches, women often carry flags or banners representing various feminist
organizations. Chants denouncing patriarchal violence, such as “lo que el pueblo necesita es
una educación no sexista,” are ubiquitous. Thanks to the efforts of feminist organizations, the
movement has incorporated the demand for “educación no sexista” into its platform, calling
for gender parity in schools and impunity for faculty accused of abuse. This movement and
the increasing presence of feminist organizations in universities shows that these are not
discrete causes; for women within the student movement, putting an end to sexism in the
classroom is equally important as demands for free, quality education.257
Student alliances with No+ AFP also show the movement’s expansion beyond the
classroom. No+ AFP is an inter-generational movement against the current pension system,
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which was enacted in 1980 by Pinochet.258 The fund, which provides abysmally low returns
for retirees, has become a catalyst for students and grandparents alike. “El movimiento No+
AFP pegó bastante porque, pucha, todos vamos a ser viejos,”259 one student bluntly
explained. This type of inter-generational coalition is reciprocal: student federations play a
prominent role in marches organized by No+ AFP, while older generations respond,
participating in student demonstrations carrying banners and flags for their own cause.
Students clearly realize that these alliances are necessary to the success of their
movement. According to Briones, the 2011 movement was fruitful in large part because
“pudimos llegar a las personas fuera del mundo estudiantil…. El movimiento estudiantil se
pudo unir junto otros movimientos sociales,” especially indigenous and environmental
mobilizations in southern Chile. Now, he sees a similar opportunity with No+ AFP:
“Tenemos una oportunidad para poder traspasar esa barrera y llegar al mundo social.”
Several times in his interview, he proposed “movimiento social por la educación,” instead of
simply the “student movement.”260 By reframing the mobilizations as a social rather than
student movement, leaders deliberately sought to expand the scope of the movement.
Both current and former students were optimistic about No+ AFP. As Ibarra said: “Yo
creo que el movimiento No más AFP es como el segundo movimiento estudiantil 2011…. Yo
creo que, sí es un movimiento que vino para quedarse, y que además nos incumba todos,
porque en el fondo todos estamos dentro de este sistema, un sistema que nació en dictadura y
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que ya se comprobó de que fue un fracaso.”261 Like the current educational system, the
pension fund also originated during the dictatorship, making their battles one and the same.
As another student eloquently put it:
[E]s súper necesario que todos estos movimientos sociales se junten porque al final lo
que se busca es el derrocamiento del neoliberalismo y todos apuntan a lo mismo, pero
desde distintas áreas. Desde la área estudiantil, desde la área de los trabajadores,
desde la gente se atiende en los hospitales públicos, desde las mujeres que somos
violentadas a diario.262
The alliance then between the student movement and No+ AFP strengthens the respective
movements and provides a unified critique of the neoliberal order.
The past year has been an important turning point for the student movement and
Chilean politics more generally. In November, journalist Beatriz Sánchez came within two
points of entering the runoff election against the eventual victor, Piñera, who was running for
a second term. Sánchez ran as an independent politician representing the Frente Amplio, a
coalition of leftist political groups formed by politicians and former student leaders such as
Boric, Jackson, and Jorge Sharp.263 Her surprising showing was heralded as a victory for the
new movement. During the campaign biased polling and unfavorable press predicted that
Sánchez would fare poorly, but she won 20.3% of the popular vote, compared to Piñera’s
36.6%. Although center-left Alejandro Guiller of the Nueva Mayoría would advance to the
runoff with Piñera before eventually losing to the former president, the unanticipated
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groundswell for Sánchez shook the mainstream media and the political establishment. This
augurs well for the Frente Amplio’s political future. Moreover, the nascent coalition obtained
its first seat in the Senate with the election of Juan Ignacio Latorre and it also elected several
deputies to the lower chamber. 264
Although many students still refuse to participate in mainstream politics, elements of
the movement have become closely aligned with the Frente Amplio. In my interviews,
several students expressed cautious optimism about the electoral results. Briones was a
strong supporter of the Frente Amplio and acknowledged that political representation was a
necessary complement to student activism. “Más allá de lo que nosotros podemos
desempeñar como estudiantes, llegamos a la conclusión que estos cambios deben ser
acompañados tanto por un lado el poder político mediante las elecciones y por otro lado una
articulación social.”265 From his perspective, change must come from both from grassroots
organizing and the ballot box.
Not all students, of course, supported the Frente Amplio or believe in the electoral
path to bring about political change. Aracely Moyano, who attends the traditionally more
leftist UPLA, told me this summer that she planned to abstain in the past election.266 “La Jota
[Juventud Comunista] y el Frente Amplio, lo que proponen es reformas y no atacar
directamente al neoliberalismo en sí, no atacar directamente al estado, sino que hacer
reformas,”267 she noted. Critiques that the Frente Amplio would settle for piecemeal reforms
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and that it would not launch a frontal attack against systemic neoliberalism were
commonplace among more radical students that I encountered.
Ibarra was even more skeptical about the Frente Amplio. Like Moyano, she was critical
of its reformist nature, saying that its platform, “[n]o hacía ninguna crítica del modelo. Lo
único que hacía era maquillar.” She went even further, suggesting that the Frente Amplio was
“a danger” to the student movement because of its ability to co-opt social movements and
incorporate them within a political project “que en el fondo lo único que van a ser va a ser
perpetuar este modelo y van a acabar con todo tipo de movimiento social que existe.”
Describing the Frente Amplio as the “mal menor,”268 or the lesser of the evils, Ibarra’s
critique reflects the perspective of many independentistas who stand further to the left of the
Frente Amplio.
These contrasting opinions are characteristic of the movement’s heterogeneous
character. While one political party will never satisfy the entirety of the student population, I
am optimistic about the Frente Amplio’s political future. One year after its founding, the
coalition already represents a formidable challenge to the Nueva Mayoría’s center-left
hegemony and the newly elected conservative administration. As a student cautiously
commented several months before the election, the Frente Amplio “[e]s un avance, pero yo
no sé se vaya a salir electo. Es un proyecto en pañales, está recién empezado.”269
But the momentum generated by the Frente Amplio’s electoral campaign will not
suffice under a Piñera presidency. Although the movement was relatively quiet during the
election cycle, students that I spoke with predict that it will reemerge in full force in the
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coming years. As Briones expressed last August: “Es difícil que haya una movilización este
año…porque es un año electoral. Y por lo que hemos visto como ha avanzado el movimiento
estudiantil desde 2011 hasta ahora, siempre es como cíclico…. Y ahora estamos en un
período más de restructuración.” 2017 saw minimal mobilizations as energy and national
attention were redirected towards the presidential election. Like many of his peers, Briones
was pessimistic about the upcoming election and expected a victory for Piñera. While he
expressed fear that Piñera “cortaría la mayoría de los pocos cambios que hemos logrado en
materia educación,” he also suggested that his election would trigger the return of mass
protests. “Entonces nos hace pensar que los próximo cuatro años en caso de que salga él sean
años movilizados, años en que vuelvan las protestas grandes, en que se agudice…las
movilizaciones.”270
Speaking even further to the left of Briones, Moyano shared the same sentiment: “Se
va a empezar el movimiento según yo, lo que creo, lo que espero, como que empieza a tomar
fuerza de nuevo. Como que empieza a revivir, después de este año, que fue bastante
muerto.”271 Both students acknowledged that the past year was “quite dead,” but they
viewed the shift to the right as a new opportunity to mobilize. As recent marches have
already shown, it is likely that the movement will remobilize in the coming years, since many
of the small victories achieved during Bachelet’s presidency are in jeopardy.
Not only is free education at risk; legal protections for women and sexual minorities
hard won by Ni una menos are also under threat. Moreover, continued efforts to privatize the
already precarious pension fund and health system are a cause for concern. Mapuche
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communities, who historically have been marginalized by the state, will likely be further
disenfranchised if the Piñera administration, as expected, promotes increased transnational
development on their lands. Increased resource extraction coupled with a likely overhaul of
environmental protections will jeopardize Chile’s natural beauty and those whose livelihoods
depend upon it. Recent racist incidents against black immigrants in Santiago mimic the
recent global surge of populist nationalism and xenophobia. As students had feared,
prospects are grim for the next four years. With so much at stake, it is hard to imagine that
the movement will remain dormant for long.
Fortunately, many of the pieces are in place for students to remobilize. As Tarrow
argues, “people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and
constraints change, and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action,
creating new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention.”272
Murmurs of discontent within the student movement have already escalated into massive
mobilizations, drawing the largest crowds since 2016.273 If the movement can develop a new
repertoire of innovative tactics and continue to connect with other movements and civil
society at large, it can mount a formidable offensive to Piñera’s second term.
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